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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A CONTRACT THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM1

PHILIP LEE*
INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom is central to the core role of professors in a free society.
Yet, current First Amendment protections exist to protect academic
institutions, not the academics themselves. For example, in Urofsky v. Gilmore,
six professors employed by various public colleges and universities in Virginia
challenged a law restricting state employees from accessing sexually explicit
material on computers owned or leased by the state.2 The professors claimed,
in part, that such a restriction was in violation of their First Amendment
academic freedom rights to conduct scholarly research.3 The Fourth Circuit
upheld the law and noted that “to the extent the Constitution recognizes any
right of ‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to
which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in
individual professors, and is not violated by the terms of the Act.”4 In other
words, this particular court held that academic freedom protects the institution
as a whole, but not the individual professors. When other courts have decided
to protect various scholarly activities through First Amendment principles,

1. A version of this Article appears in chapters 4–6 of PHILIP LEE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PROFESSIONAL NORMS, AND
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES (2015), published by Lexington Books. Professor Lee’s book also
contains expanded discussions on the history of the American Association of University
Professors, additional professorial freedom categories based on the First Amendment, and a
related case study.
* Assistant Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law, University of the District of
Columbia; B.A., Duke University, 1996; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000; Ed.M., Harvard
Graduate School of Education, 2012; Ed.D., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2013. I
dedicate this Article to my mom and dad, who have shown me love and encouragement for all of
my days. I am grateful to Julie Reuben, Natasha Warikoo, Bob O’Neil, Marc Johnson, Michael
Horne, Adrienne Mundy-Shephard, and Eddie Contreras for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article, and to Joe Singer, Todd Rakoff, Bob Iuliano, Henry Rosovsky, and Larry
Bacow for stimulating discussion regarding academic freedom.
2. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2000).
3. Id. at 405.
4. Id. at 410 (emphasis added). Note that Chief Judge Harvie J. Wilkinson’s concurring
opinion in this case disagrees with the reasoning of the majority opinion and warns about the
dangers to academic freedom that it poses. See id. at 426–35 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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their analysis has generally been rooted in public employee free speech
analysis, and has not taken into account the unique context of American higher
education.
In this Article, I argue that the dominant constitutional analysis of
academic freedom is insufficient to protect the full range of academic freedom
interests that have emerged over time. Specifically, constitutionally based
academic freedom is unduly limited by: (1) the state action doctrine; (2) the
constraints of public employee free speech principles; and (3) the judicial
interpretations that grant this freedom to universities only, leaving professors
without this protection when their interests collide with their universities.
Thus, constitutionally based academic freedom is inadequate to preserve the
free exchange of ideas that universities are supposed to epitomize.
As an alternative to an exclusively First Amendment foundation for this
freedom, I argue for a contract law-based conception specifically for
professors. Contract law allows courts to protect the rights of professors at both
public and private universities. It also allows for the recognition of
professional norms and academic custom in interpreting the rights and duties
of professors and their universities. Finally, contract law also allows courts to
structure remedies that take into account the specific campus contexts that give
rise to various disputes. Therefore, in order to create more consistency in the
law and an alignment between institutional and professorial protections at both
public and private universities, I argue that while constitutional law is still the
proper mechanism for defending institutional rights from government
interference, contract law should be the primary mechanism for protecting
professorial academic freedom. While professors at state institutions would
have additional First Amendment protections against their employers, for
reasons I detail in this Article, I contend that these protections are insufficient.
Thus, developing a rich body of contract law on this subject would greatly
enhance professorial academic freedom across the country.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the evolution of
judicial conceptions of academic freedom. Part II then analyzes the limitations
of constitutionally based academic freedom to protect professors engaging in
their scholarly work. Given these constraints, Part III concludes with an
exploration of contract law as a better foundation for professorial academic
freedom.
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PART I: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE COURTS
A.

Constitutionally Based Academic Freedom
1.

Institutional Academic Freedom: Alignment of Professorial and
University Interests Against State Action.

Starting in the 1950s, courts started to grapple with defining academic
freedom—using the concept to protect universities from the excesses of
government authority during the McCarthy period.5 The McCarthy era was a
time of anti-Communist hysteria that used congressional hearings and other
mechanisms to purge people thought to have Communist affiliation from
American life.6 If the government required proof of loyalty from professors,
universities generally became complicit in ferreting out those deemed
“disloyal” by association, not by action. Christopher J. Lucas writes:
The sad history of what happened in higher education between 1940 and the
mid-fifties when McCarthyism held sway offers yet another cautionary tale
about the fragility of academic freedom in American life. Although it is true
there were many instances where there was resistance, in the main, when
academe was pressured to cleanse itself of suspected dissidents, colleges and
7
universities readily accepted.

At least 100 tenured or continuing professors were dismissed by universities
around the country for suspected Communist affiliations or refusal to testify
against friends, colleagues, and neighbors with such suspected ties.8
The constitutional foundation for academic freedom arose from a number
of cases that originated as challenges to unfettered government intrusion in
relation to public universities during the McCarthy era. Even though faculty
members sued to vindicate their individual rights in each of these cases, the
interests of their universities were aligned with theirs—therefore, the courts did
not create a distinction between the professors’ and the institutions’ rights.
Academic freedom was presumed to lie with the state institution—and to
include the protection of the collective faculty. This situation, where
professorial and institutional interests align, was typical in the early academic
freedom court cases of the 1950s.

5. See ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES
3–4 (1986).
6. See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 3
(1990); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES 13 (3d ed. 2002); ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE
OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 1 (2d ed. 2002).
7. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 330 (2d ed.
2006).
8. See ROBERT O’NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD: POLITICAL
EXTREMISM, CORPORATE POWER, AND THE UNIVERSITY 23 (2008).
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These McCarthy-era cases defined a public university’s right, based
primarily on First Amendment principles, to be free from state interference in
making educational decisions.9 The First Amendment provides, in pertinent
part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”10
Although the text of this amendment makes no mention of academic freedom,
a number of courts have held that academic freedom implicates First
Amendment rights.
As early as 1952, in Wieman v. Updegraff, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a law that barred people who were members of “subversive
organizations” from public employment.11 Faculty members at a state college
challenged the law on due process grounds.12 In Justice Felix Frankfurter’s
concurring opinion, which would serve as precursor to his subsequent views on
academic freedom, he discussed both First and Fourteenth Amendment
concerns and stressed the public importance of free-thinking scholars.13 He
wrote:
To regard teachers—in our entire educational system, from the primary grades
to the university—as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in
hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of openmindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens,
who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. . . .
They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into
the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social
14
and economic dogma.

Four years later, in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York
City, a professor at Brooklyn College challenged his dismissal, which was
based on a state law that required public colleges in New York to dismiss any
employee who exercised his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination when testifying before investigatory committees.15 The Court
struck down the law on due process grounds.16
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal academic freedom
case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire.17 The Court held that a state investigation
of a visiting guest lecturer at the University of New Hampshire, who was
allegedly a “subversive person” for the content of his classroom speech and his

9. Note that some of the earlier cases relied on due process grounds to invalidate certain
state laws. The focus would soon shift to First Amendment principles.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
12. Id. at 185.
13. Id. at 195–96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 196.
15. Slochower v. Bd. Of Higher Educ. of N.Y.C., 350 U.S. 551, 552 (1956).
16. Id. at 559.
17. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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extramural political associations, was a violation of his due process and free
association rights.18 The Court observed, “We believe that there
unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the areas of
academic freedom and political expression—areas in which government
should be extremely reticent to tread.”19 The Court elaborated:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
20
civilization will stagnate and die.

Justice Felix Frankfurter, in oft-cited concurring language in Sweezy, defined
the four essential freedoms of a university “to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.”21 Justice Frankfurter’s four essential freedoms
would become a crucial element to later constitutional cases that would grapple
with the meaning of academic freedom.
Sweezy was followed by a succession of cases that substantially weakened
the government’s grip over public schools (K–12) and colleges and
universities. In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute
that required all teachers in public schools or colleges to annually disclose
organizational memberships.22 The Court observed, “The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.”23 In 1964, the Court decided Baggett v. Bullitt.24 In
Baggett, professors, staff members, and students from the University of
Washington challenged a loyalty oath on constitutional grounds.25 The Court
held that the oath requirement was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, a
violation of basic First Amendment principles.26

18. Id. at 246–47.
19. Id. at 250.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960).
23. Id. at 487.
24. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 360 (1964).
25. Id. at 361.
26. Id. at 366. Interestingly, the Court recognized the academic freedom of students—albeit
it did so indirectly in addressing the standing of the students to sue. The Court observed:
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Three years later, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of
New York, the concept of academic freedom was explicitly connected to the
First Amendment.27 Keyishian involved a challenge to a loyalty oath for state
employees brought by four State University of New York professors and a
university librarian who also served as a part-time lecturer in English.28 The
Court struck down the oath requirement (i.e., the Feinberg Law) as a violation
of the First Amendment.29 The Court noted:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
30
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.

The Court also observed, “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.’”31
In the same term as Keyishian, the Court decided Whitehill v. Elkins. In
Whitehill, a potential hire who was offered a teaching position at the University

Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the professors and other state
employees required to take the oath, and the interests of the students at the University in
academic freedom are fully protected by a judgment in favor of the teaching personnel,
we have no occasion to pass on the standing of the students to bring this suit.
Id. at 366 n.5.
27. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
28. Id. at 592.
29. Id. at 609. This case overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Adler v. Board of
Education (upholding the Feinberg Law). Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952). Note
that Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Adler, was the first to mention “academic
freedom” in a judicial opinion. Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He wrote:
The mere fact of membership in the organization raises a prima facie case of her own
guilt. She may, it is said, show her innocence. But innocence in this case turns on
knowledge; and when the witch hunt is on, one who must rely on ignorance leans on a
feeble reed. The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic
freedom.
Id. He further explained:
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state. . . . A pall is
cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that environment.
Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can
be no exercise of the free intellect. . . . This system of spying and surveillance with its
accompanying reports and trials cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom. It
produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth. Yet it was the pursuit of truth
which the First Amendment was designed to protect.
Id. at 510–11.
30. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
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of Maryland challenged the constitutionality of a state-mandated loyalty oath
that was a prerequisite for his employment.32 The loyalty oath required the
professor to certify that he was “not engaged in one way or another in the
attempt to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the State of
Maryland, or any political subdivision of either of them, by force or
violence.”33 The Court, in a unanimous opinion, struck down the oath
requirement.34 Relying on the principles set forth in Sweezy, the Court
observed, “We are in the First Amendment field. The continuing surveillance
which this type of law places on teachers is hostile to academic freedom.”35
Starting in the 1970s, courts began to rely on the language contained in
McCarthy-era academic freedom cases—especially Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Sweezy—to define academic freedom as a special deference to
universities in their educational decisions that insulated them from state
interference, including interference from courts.36 In these cases, like the
earlier ones from the 1950s and 60s, the interests of the institutions and their
professors were aligned; therefore, no distinction between institutional and
professorial freedoms was discussed. For example, in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, the Court upheld race-conscious admissions at UCDavis Medical School.37 In Bakke, a white male applicant, who was denied
admission after two attempts, challenged the race-conscious admissions policy
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.38 Under this constitutional
provision, the government is required to justify its actions based on different
levels of review depending on the nature of the rights involved or the
classifications made.39 If the government action infringes upon a fundamental
right or makes classifications based on a person’s membership in a suspect
class (e.g., race or ethnicity), then the applicable standard of review for a court
hearing the challenge is strict scrutiny.40 The Court found that the relevant
standard for Bakke was strict scrutiny since the policy in question was based on

32. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 55 (1967).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 62.
35. Id. at 59–60.
36. For a fascinating account of the historic rationale for judicial deference to academic
decisions see Robert M. O’Neil, Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions: An Outmoded
Concept?, 36 J.C. & U.L. 729, 729–47 (2010).
37. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–71 (1978).
38. Id. at 276–78.
39. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”).
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racial classifications.41 When strict scrutiny is applied, the government must
show that its action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.42
Justice Powell, writing the plurality opinion, found that educational diversity
was a compelling government interest under strict scrutiny review.43 The
Court, citing Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy, reasoned that
academic freedom for a university includes the discretion to select its own
student body on educational grounds.44 This constitutionally permissible use of
race, based on the discretion afforded universities under academic freedom to
choose whom to admit, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in both Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.45 These companion cases involved challenges
to the race-conscious admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law
School and undergraduate program, respectively. In affirming the University of
Michigan Law School’s policy in Grutter, the Court observed:
We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition. . . . Our conclusion that the Law School has a
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that
attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper
institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a university is
46
“presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”

In the most recent challenge to race-conscious admissions, Fisher v.
University of Texas, the Court deferred to the university’s educational
41. Id. at 299. The other two levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and rational basis
review. If the government action makes classifications based on a person’s membership in a
quasi-suspect class (e.g., gender), then the court hearing the challenge will apply intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that intermediate scrutiny
applies to classifications by gender). Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must
demonstrate that its actions were substantially related to an important government objective. Id.
(“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). Finally, for all other categories of state
action (e.g., economic regulations), the court hearing the challenge will apply rational basis
review—in which the government must show that its actions were rationally related to a
legitimate state objective. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(holding rational basis review applies to economic regulations). Strict scrutiny is the most
difficult standard of review for a law to survive. Rational basis review, on the other hand, is the
least stringent. Intermediate scrutiny falls somewhere in between the two.
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (“When [the classifications] touch upon an individual’s race or
ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”).
43. Id. at 312–14.
44. Id. at 312.
45. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–75 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
343–44 (2003).
46. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
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judgment as to the compelling interest that diversity serves, but remanded the
case for the lower court to properly apply the narrow tailoring analysis to the
means chosen to further that interest.47 From Bakke to Fisher, therefore, the
Court has shown deference to the university’s educational judgments.
In the context of academic dismissals, the Court has also given deference
to universities. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, a medical student at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School brought a due process
challenge to her dismissal during her final year of study for failure to meet
academic standards.48 The Court, in ruling that due process was satisfied,
differentiated the heightened process required for disciplinary dismissals to the
facts at hand in the following way:
The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic
judgment of school officials that she did not have the necessary clinical ability
to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient
progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and
evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average
disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the
proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a
student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
49
administrative decisionmaking.

In other words, academic dismissals required academic judgments that are best
made by school officials. Further, in Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing, the Court upheld a medical school’s decision to dismiss a student on
academic grounds.50 The medical school refused to allow the student to re-take
an exam after that student failed with the lowest score in the history of the
program.51 In recognizing academic freedom at the institutional level, the
Court deferred to the educational judgment of the medical school to determine
whether a student should be dismissed based on academic grounds.52 In a
footnote, the Court also acknowledged the potential conflict between
institutional and professorial freedoms, noting: “Academic freedom thrives not
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and
students . . . but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decisionmaking by the academy itself . . . .”53 This tension will be highlighted
in cases where professorial and institutional interests diverge.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79 (1978).
Id. at 89–90.
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215 (1985).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

470

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:461

In cases where students have claimed free speech rights in the face of
educational judgments made by universities, institutional academic freedom
has fared well.54 In a case decided by the Ninth Circuit, Brown v. Li, a student
at the University of California at Santa Barbara challenged the university’s
refusal, based on its curriculum requirements, to allow the student to include a
“disacknowledgements” section in his master’s thesis as a violation of his free
speech rights.55 This section began, “I would like to offer special Fuck You’s to
the following degenerates for of [sic] being an ever-present hindrance in my
graduate career. . . .” and identified a number of university affiliates and others
that supposedly hindered his progress toward his degree.56 The court found for
the university, noting that the “decision was reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical objective: teaching [the plaintiff] the proper format for a scientific
paper.”57 Similarly, in a case before a federal district court, Yacovelli v.
Moeser, a number of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC)
students brought a Free Exercise Clause claim against the university to prevent
it from assigning a book with a positive portrayal of Islam.58 The reading
assignment was part of an orientation program for all freshmen. UNC allowed
any student who objected to the reading to opt out of the assignment.59 The
district court, giving deference to the university’s educational judgment,
dismissed the students’ claim.60 The court noted, “UNC, instead of endorsing a
particular religious viewpoint, merely undertook to engage students in a
scholarly debate . . . about the Islamic religion. Students were free to share
their opinions on the topic whether their opinions be positive, negative or
neutral.”61
Institutional academic freedom, however, is not absolute. Universities are
given discretion to make their educational decisions unless these decisions are
constitutionally or otherwise legally prohibited. For example, in Bakke,
although the educational benefits of diversity were deemed compelling for
equal protection purposes, the two-tiered admissions process—one for regular
applicants and a separate one for racial minorities that were considered
“disadvantaged”—was struck down for not being narrowly tailored.62 The
same result occurred as with the University of Michigan’s undergraduate
admissions policy in Gratz, which assigned a specific weight to

54. Students’ free speech rights are beyond the scope of this Article so they will not be
addressed in detail here.
55. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2002).
56. Id. at 943.
57. Id. at 952.
58. Yacovelli v. Moeser, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 763–65.
61. Id. at 764.
62. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–73, 320 (1978).
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underrepresented minority status that proved determinative in the admissions
decision.63 The only race-conscious admissions policy that has survived strict
scrutiny review by the U.S. Supreme Court was the University of Michigan
Law School’s in Grutter, which employed flexible, individualized, holistic
review.64 So, although the Court will grant some deference to universities
based on institutional academic freedom, it will still scrutinize these decisions
to ensure compliance with constitutional principles. This scrutiny can also be
seen in antidiscrimination law.
In Powell v. Syracuse University, a visiting architecture professor
challenged her termination as a product of racial and sexual bias.65 Even
though the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of her claims,
the court nonetheless recognized that the academic freedom of a university
does not embrace “the freedom to discriminate.”66 Similarly, in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, the university challenged the EEOC’s refusal to
exclude relevant peer review materials in a discrimination case brought by a
Chinese-American female professor who was denied tenure.67 The university
claimed a special academic freedom privilege protecting disclosure of peer
review materials based on principles of institutional academic freedom to
determine “who may teach.”68 The Court summarized the university’s
argument as follows:
[I]t argues that the First Amendment is infringed by disclosure of peer review
materials because disclosure undermines the confidentiality which is central to
the peer review process, and this in turn is central to the tenure process, which
in turn is the means by which [the university] seeks to exercise its asserted
69
academic-freedom right of choosing who will teach.

The Court then observed, “To verbalize the claim is to recognize how distant
the burden is from the asserted right.”70 The Court ruled for the professor
holding that the she had an unqualified right to acquire the peer review
materials to determine whether illegal discrimination took place.71 This case
serves as a reminder that universities’ claims to academic freedom will not
immunize them from the strictures of Title VII and other federal laws.
Some courts have acknowledged that universities provide a special context
in matters involving free expression relating to conditional grants. In Rust v.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72, 275 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–35 (2003).
Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1151 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1151, 1154.
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 184–86 (1990).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201–02.
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Sullivan, the Court held that the Department of Health and Human Services’
regulations limiting the ability of recipients of federal funding to engage in
abortion-related activities were constitutionally permissible.72 However, the
Court noted that such restrictions on funding in higher educational contexts
may engender a different result by noting:
[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of
conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the
73
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.

Other cases have presented a narrower view. For example, in Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”), the Court rejected
the law schools’ argument that they should have the discretion, under First
Amendment principles, to exclude military recruiters on their campuses.74 The
law schools contended that such exclusion was as an expression of their
opposition to military policies that discriminate against openly LGBT soldiers,
and they should, therefore, not be penalized by the loss of federal funding
under the Solomon Amendment.75 The Court rejected the law schools’ free
speech claim and held for the military, observing that “[n]othing about
recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and
nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say
about the military’s policies.”76 This case demonstrates that institutional
expression can be limited by federal funding regulations.
In addition to institutional academic freedom, individual professors also
have protections in their scholarly work based on First Amendment principles.
I will explore some of these protections in the next part.
2.

Academic Freedom as Free Speech for Professors: Divergence of
Professorial and University Interests

A number of cases have recognized that First Amendment protections can
apply to a public university professor’s right to engage in his or her scholarly
work at the university and speech outside the classroom. In most of these
cases, the interests of professors and their universities are at odds; indeed, the
typical dispute arises when professors are punished for veering away from
institutional mandates such as sexual harassment policies, grading rules, or
internet usage restrictions. The professors have then pressed their claims in

72.
73.
74.
(2006).
75.
76.

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78, 203 (1991).
Id. at 200.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53, 56
Id. at 51–53.
Id. at 65.
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court, claiming that the state universities have infringed on their constitutional
rights. In these cases, the dichotomy between institutional and professorial
rights becomes clear. To illustrate this distinction between institutional and
professorial freedom, I analyze court cases that support the existence of the
following five broad categories of professorial freedom: 1) classroom teaching;
2) faculty speech not related to teaching; 3) curricular decisions; 4) grading;
and 5) research.77
a.

Faculty Speech Related to Classroom Teaching

Professor speech at public universities is protected by the same principles
that protect the free speech of all other public employees. In Pickering v.
Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time that a
public employee could claim First Amendment protection while speaking as a
citizen on matters of public concern.78 Prior to Pickering, the dominant legal
view was that public employees relinquished constitutional rights by agreeing
to work for the government. For example, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, a police officer was fired for violating a rule against political
canvassing.79 The police officer challenged the termination in court, but the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the officer waived his
constitutional rights by signing his employment contract observing:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free
80
speech . . . by the implied terms of his contract.

This view would be dominant until Pickering was decided in 1968.
Pickering involved a high school teacher who challenged his termination
for publishing critical comments about the school leadership.81 Specifically,
the teacher wrote a letter to a newspaper that criticized the Board of
Education’s allocation of school funds between educational and athletic
programs and the Board’s and the superintendent’s methods of preventing the
school district’s taxpayers from knowing the real reasons why additional
revenues were being requested for the schools.82 The Court, in ruling for the

77. In a book that I am currently writing, under a publication agreement with Lexington
Books, I expand these general categories to include faculty artistic expression and shared
governance.
78. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968).
79. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
80. Id. at 517–18. This view was later superseded by the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415,
1415–16 (1989).
81. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
82. Id. at 569.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

474

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:461

teacher, articulated the following balancing test: “The problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”83
Free speech protection for public employees was, therefore, not absolute.
The Court must first make a determination under Pickering that the public
employee was speaking as a citizen on “matters of public concern.”84 After this
threshold issue is determined, a balancing test would then be employed to
determine if the speech would be protected under the First Amendment. The
contours of the Pickering test were subsequently defined by a number of
Supreme Court cases, including Mount Healthy School District Board of
Education v. Doyle and Connick v. Myers.85 Subsequent court decisions have
relied on the Pickering test in a variety of public employment contexts,
including those brought by college and university professors who are
attempting to protect their classroom speech.
While determining if professor speech used in classroom teaching is
protected under the Pickering test, many courts have looked to the pedagogical
relevance of the disputed speech.86 Specifically, these courts have found that

83. Id. at 568.
84. Id.
85. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–49 (1983) (holding that public employees
speaking about internal office matters are not speaking on matters of public concern and,
therefore, not protected by Pickering); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (defining the following procedure for Pickering analysis: First, the plaintiff
must prove that he engaged in constitutionally protected speech—i.e., plaintiff spoke as a citizen
on matters of public concern and whose speech interest outweighed the employer’s interest in
prescribing the speech. Second, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was a “substantial” or
“motivating” factor behind the termination. Third, the defendant can avoid liability if it can show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision to terminate the
plaintiff, even in the absence of the protected conduct). See also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 677–78 (1994) (holding that it was not necessary to determine what an employee actually
said, as long as the employee had a reasonable belief as to the content and a reasonable belief that
such content would cause workplace disruption); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380–81,
388, 392 (1987) (holding that the speech of a county deputy constable who was overheard by a
co-worker making comments regarding a presidential assassination attempt was a matter of public
concern and the balance weighed in employee’s favor under Pickering).
86. Note that some courts have just applied the pedagogical relevance test without any
reference to Pickering. See, e.g., Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that sexual harassment policy as applied to the professor in this case was too
vague, noting that he “was simply without any notice that the Policy would be applied in such a
way as to punish his longstanding teaching style—a style which, until the College imposed
punishment upon Cohen under the Policy, had apparently been considered pedagogically sound
and within the bounds of teaching methodology permitted at the College.”); Kracunas v. Iona
Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the relevant standard for the protection of the
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the speech must be germane to the content that the professor is teaching about
in order to be protected by the First Amendment. For example, in Hardy v.
Jefferson Community College, an adjunct instructor was dismissed for using
the words “nigger” and “bitch” in his class regarding the impact of such
oppressive and disparaging language.87 In applying the “public concern” prong
of Pickering, the Sixth Circuit noted:
Because the essence of a teacher’s role is to prepare students for their place in
society as responsible citizens, classroom instruction will often fall within the
Supreme Court’s broad conception of “public concern.”. . . Although Hardy’s
in-class speech does not itself constitute pure public debate, it does relate to
matters of overwhelming public concern—race, gender, and power conflicts in
88
our society.

In applying the Pickering balancing test, the court held, “On balance,
Hardy’s rights to free speech and academic freedom outweigh the College's
interest in limiting that speech.”89 In Dube v. State University of New York, an
assistant professor of Africana Studies claimed that he was denied tenure for
discussing controversial subjects in the classroom.90 Specifically, the professor
made comparisons between Nazism in Germany, Apartheid in South Africa,
and Zionism in Israel in a class titled The Politics of Race.91 The Second
Circuit remanded the First Amendment claims to trial and rejected qualified
immunity as a defense.92 In citing to Pickering and other cases, the Second
Circuit observed that “assuming the defendants retaliated against [the
professor] based upon the content of his classroom discourse, such conduct
was, as a matter of law, objectively unreasonable.”93
Some courts have refused to apply college sexual harassment policies to
punish professors who had legitimate pedagogical reasons for teaching in a
provocative way. In Silva v. University of New Hampshire, a tenured professor
brought an action against the university after he was dismissed for violating the

professor’s speech was whether it “was done in good faith as part of his teaching . . . [or] as
appropriate to further a pedagogical purpose.”).
87. Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 675 (6th Cir. 2001).
88. Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 682.
90. Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 589.
92. Id. at 600. In a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, qualified immunity
protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
93. Dube, 900 F.2d at 598. But see Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 468 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding qualified immunity defense because no court has clearly established First Amendment
academic freedom rights for the type of conduct that the professor engaged in).
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university’s sexual harassment policy.94 The professor, while teaching a course
on technical writing, engaged the students in a number of sex-themed
discussions. For example, he compared the relationship between writers and
their subjects to the sexual relationships between people.95 He also illustrated
how a good definition combines a general classification with concrete specifics
by invoking the following analogy, “Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with
a vibrator under the plate.”96 The professor claimed that he used these sexual
examples because he was trying to catch the attention of his class and relate
abstract concepts to everyday experiences.97 A number of female students
complained about these examples and the professor was eventually dismissed
after a formal hearing.98 In finding that Silva’s speech touched on matters of
public concern, the court recognized:
It is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that the
preservation of academic freedom is a matter of public concern. . . . Further,
the issue of whether speech which is offensive to a particular class of
individuals should be tolerated in American schools is a matter of public
99
concern.

The court held in this regard, “The evidence . . . demonstrates that Silva’s
classroom statements were not statements ‘upon matters only of personal
interest,’ but rather were made for the legitimate pedagogical, public purpose
of conveying certain principles related to the subject matter of his course.” 100
The court then, under what it called the “Connick-Pickering balancing test,”
held, “Silva’s First Amendment interest in the speech at issue is
overwhelmingly superior to UNH’s interest in proscribing said speech.”101
Other courts have recognized situations where professors were not shielded
by the First Amendment because the classroom speech was not relevant to the
subject matter. For example, in Bonnell v. Lorenzo, a community college
professor was dismissed for using offensive language in class unrelated to any
legitimate teaching purpose.102 He consistently used the words “fuck,” “cunt,”
“pussy,” “shit,” “damn,” and “ass” and made a number of sexual jokes in his
English class without any pedagogical purpose.103 In finding that some of the
speech—namely the professor’s sarcastic apology—touched on matters of

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 317 (D.N.H. 1994).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 311.
Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 315 (citations omitted).
Id. at 316.
Id.
Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 802–03 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 805.
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public concern and balancing the interests under Pickering, the Sixth Circuit
held for the student, noting:
While a professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are
paramount in the academic setting, they are not absolute to the point of
compromising a student’s right to learn in a hostile-free environment. To hold
otherwise under these circumstances would send a message that the First
Amendment may be used as a shield by teachers who choose to use their
unique and superior position to sexually harass students secure in the
104
knowledge that whatever they say or do would be protected.

Similarly, in Martin v. Parrish, a college professor challenged his
termination for his incessant use of profanity in the classroom.105 The professor
browbeat his students with expletives such as “bullshit,” “hell,” “damn,” “God
damn,” and “sucks” in response to their alleged poor attitude.106 The professor
claimed that his speech was protected by the First Amendment.107 The Fifth
Circuit, in applying Pickering (although citing only to Connick v. Meyers),
held for the university.108 The Court noted that the professor’s abusive speech
did not relate to matters of public concern and, therefore, did not even reach
the balancing test.109 The Court further noted that the students were a “captive”
audience and they “paid to be taught and not be vilified in indecent terms.”110
In Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College, a part-time instructor of cosmetology at a
community college located in Galesburg, Illinois, gave a gay student two
religious pamphlets on the sinfulness of homosexuality.111 After the student
complained to administrators, the instructor was terminated.112 The instructor
then challenged the termination on First Amendment grounds.113 The Seventh
Circuit, applying Pickering, ruled for the college.114 Assuming that the
instructor’s proselytizing related to matters of public concern, the court then
noted that “we see no reason why a college or university cannot direct its
instructors to keep personal discussions about sexual orientation or religion out
of a cosmetology class or clinic.”115
The outcomes of these cases have turned on the pedagogical relevance of
the speech at issue. When the professors’ classroom speech was not germane to

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 823–24.
Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 583–84 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 585.
Martin, 805 F.2d at 586.
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 671, 673.
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any pedagogical purpose—e.g., the professors just used profanity for its own
sake or engaged in conduct that antagonized their students—the speech was
not protected under the Pickering test.
In 2006, Pickering was substantially narrowed by Garcetti v. Ceballos.116
Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who claimed retaliation for a
memorandum he wrote and circulated to his supervisors criticizing factual
inaccuracies in an affidavit related to a pending criminal case.117 The Court
held that this public employee was not protected under Pickering because
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”118 Concerned about the implications that the majority opinion
would have on professor speech at public universities, Justice Souter wrote in
dissent:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious
enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I
have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose
119
teachers necessarily speak and write “pursuant to . . . official duties.”

The majority responded in language that has become known as the Garcetti
reservation:
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech
120
related to scholarship or teaching.

Courts that have subsequently applied Garcetti to speech involving classroom
teaching have generally recognized the reservation. In Kerr v. Hurd, a federal
district court ruled that a medical professor’s speech—in which he advocated
vaginal delivery to his students over Caesarean sections and lectured on the use
of forceps—was protected under the First Amendment.121 A federal district
court in Ohio noted:
Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is
important to protecting First Amendment values. Universities should be the
active trading floors in the marketplace of ideas. Public universities should be

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 842 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
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no different from private universities in that respect. At least where, as here,
the expressed views are well within the range of accepted medical opinion,
they should certainly receive First Amendment protection, particularly at the
122
university level.

Similarly, in Sheldon v. Dhillon, a federal district court in California
recognized that the “official duties” analysis in Garcetti did not apply to a
biology professor’s teaching-related comments regarding possible scientific
causes of homosexuality.123
In sum, courts have analyzed professor classroom speech under the First
Amendment by using public employee free speech principles. They have
attempted to distinguish constitutionally protected, pedagogically relevant
speech from unprotected harassing speech by protecting the former but not the
latter. Based on recent cases, professors at state universities have the strongest
level of constitutional protection in speech related to their teaching.
b.

Faculty Speech Not Related to Classroom Teaching

In the wake of Garcetti, lower courts have struggled to consistently apply
what academic freedom means in situations where professor speech outside the
classroom-teaching context and university interests are at odds—particularly in
situations where professors have criticized their administrations.
Reflecting on Garcetti, Judith Areen argues that restricting university
professors to only promoting government-approved messages would interfere
with the traditional role of public higher education and would, thus, be an
unconstitutional prohibition against free speech.124 This approach has gained
limited traction in the courts. Indeed, a number of courts have simply ignored
the Garcetti majority’s stated reservation and found that university professor
speech criticizing university management was not protected by the First
Amendment any more than other public employees’ speech.
In Renken v. Gregory, a tenured engineering professor at the University of
Wisconsin at Milwaukee had his pay reduced and his research funding
terminated after he criticized the university’s use of grant funds.125 He brought

122. Id.
123. Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438 RMW, 2009 WL 4282086, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
25, 2009).
124. Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 999–1000 (2009). Areen
makes an analogy to Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a rule that legal services attorneys could not make certain arguments when
representing clients seeking to change existing welfare law. Id. at 992; see also Legal Services
Corp. v Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001). The Court recognized that such a rule could
interfere with the traditional role of attorneys in the judicial system and was, therefore, an
unconstitutional prohibition against free speech. Id. at 534.
125. Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 770–72 (7th Cir. 2008).
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a First Amendment challenge in court.126 The Seventh Circuit, relying on
Garcetti, held that the professor was not protected by the First Amendment
because he “was speaking as a faculty employee, and not as a private citizen,
because administering the grant . . . fell within his teaching and service duties
that he was employed to perform.”127 Similarly, in Gorum v. Sessoms, a
tenured communications professor at Delaware State University was
terminated for making critical comments against the administration, for
advising a student-athlete who violated the university disciplinary code, and
for rescinding an invitation to the university president to speak at a public
event.128 The Third Circuit, also relying on Garcetti, held the professor was not
protected by the First Amendment because he was acting in accordance with
his official duties, and not as a private citizen.129
In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit gave proponents of professorial
academic freedom hope that some judges would be willing to recognize a
constitutionally based protection for individual professors speaking on matters
outside of classroom teaching. Adams v. Trustees of the University of North
Carolina-Wilmington involved a state university professor’s challenge to his
university’s refusal to promote him to full professor, which he alleged was
based on his outspoken Christian and conservative beliefs.130 This professor
publicized his beliefs in various fora outside the university including
conservative internet news sites and radio and television broadcasts. The
university argued that Garcetti precluded the professor’s First Amendment
claims because the professor’s speech was made in relation to his official
duties as a state employee.131 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument noting:
Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member
under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First Amendment
protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in
during his employment. That would not appear to be what Garcetti intended,
nor is it consistent with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses
his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. In light
of the above factors, we will not apply Garcetti to the circumstances of this
132
case.

This holding, thus, recognized an exception to Garcetti for a professor’s
speech not related to classroom teaching. Similarly, in Demers v. Austin, the
Ninth Circuit held that a tenured Washington State University professor’s

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 182–84 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 185.
Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 553 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 564.
Id.
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distribution of a pamphlet and submission of an in-progress book, both of
which were critical of the university, were matters of public concern under
Pickering.133 The Court made it clear that Garcetti did not apply to these types
of professorial speech.134
Other courts have ruled more narrowly, finding faculty criticism of
university policies outside the realm of protected speech. In Payne v.
University of Arkansas, Fort Smith, a tenured professor was demoted for
criticizing a university policy that increased the minimum hours that faculty
members were expected to be present on campus.135 Relying on Garcetti, the
court held:
Plaintiff’s email and subsequent discussion . . . regarding the policy was a
criticism of a condition of employment, not of public concern. Accordingly,
the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s speech does not relate to
matters of public concern for the purposes of Pickering and, therefore, is not
136
protected speech under the First Amendment.

Further, in Hong v. Grant, a tenured engineering professor at the
University of California at Irvine was denied a merit salary increase because of
his critical statements to other faculty members regarding the hiring and
promotion of some of his colleagues and regarding the university’s use of
lecturers to teach courses.137 In ruling for the university, the federal district
court noted that the professor’s statements “were made pursuant to his official
duties as a faculty member and therefore do not deserve First Amendment
protection.”138 In other words, the professor’s speech, which the court found
connected to his duties as a professor, was not at all protected by the First
Amendment. Robert M. O’Neil notes that a bizarre result of this ruling, if
taken to its logical conclusion, would be that faculty members “would, in
effect, be able to speak freely only about matters that are remote from their
academic disciplines and expertise, while being denied such protection when
speaking or writing within that realm.”139
Some courts have viewed speech made on a faculty governance committee
as not protected by the First Amendment. In Isenalumhe v. McDuffie, two
tenured nursing professors at Medgar Evars College of the City University of
New York, who were members of various faculty committees, complained

133. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014).
134. Id. at 412.
135. Payne v. Univ. of Ark. Fort Smith, No. 04-2189, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52806 at *3, *9,
*12 (W.D. Ark. July 26, 2006).
136. Id. at *13.
137. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
138. Id. at 1168.
139. Robert M. O’Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 1, 20 (2008).
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about the process of instituting curricular changes and the process of hiring
new faculty.140 They claimed that the department chairperson subsequently
retaliated against them for these complaints.141 A New York federal district
court held that the disputed speech was made pursuant to their official duties as
faculty committee members and was not speech made by citizens on matters of
public concern.142 In a similar vein, in Savage v. Gee, the head reference
librarian at Ohio State University at Mansfield claimed that he was retaliated
against for suggesting a book to assign to all incoming freshman while he was
serving on a faculty committee convened for that purpose.143 The book
contained “a chapter discussing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior.”144
While recognizing that there may be a possible Garcetti exception to “teaching
or research,” the Ohio federal trial court held that the librarian’s
recommendation was neither.145 Instead, the court found, it was made
“pursuant to [his] official duties” in serving on the committee and was,
therefore, not protected under the First Amendment.146 These decisions stand
in stark contrast to the view that faculty speech related to faculty governance—
made pursuant to service on governance committees—should be protected by
academic freedom.
In summary, a professor’s speech at state institutions not related to
classroom teaching is governed by the same legal framework that protects the
speech of all government employees. Specifically, if the professor is speaking
as a citizen on matters of public concerns, courts will apply the Pickering
balancing test to determine if the speech is protected.147 However, if a court

140. Isenalumhe v. McDuffie, 697 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
141. Id. at 369.
142. Id. at 378.
143. Savage v. Gee, 716 F. Supp. 2d 709, 710, 713 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
144. Id. at 711.
145. Id. at 718.
146. Id. at 717.
147. Some courts will apply a different test for situations in which universities impose prior
restraints on unspoken speech. This situation is unlike the Pickering line of cases because instead
of being punished after engaging in prohibited speech, the professors or students are instead
prohibited from speaking altogether. For example, in Crue v. Aiken, the University of Illinois,
pursuant to athletic regulations, did not allow Native American students to communicate with
prospective student-athletes. The students wanted to inform these prospective students about their
views on a current mascot controversy. Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004). Relying
on United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), the Court
articulated a balancing test for prior restraints on speech in which the government must
demonstrate “the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future
employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by the expressions’
‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.” Id. at 678. The Seventh Circuit
held that the students’ right to express what they saw was a blatantly racist practice outweighed
the university’s interest in suppressing the speech. Id. at 680.
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determines that a professor is speaking as a public employee, and not as a
citizen on matters of public concern, then the speech is not protected by the
First Amendment. Courts have generally held that professorial speech on
matters of institutional functioning are made as part of official employment
duties and, thus, not matters of public concern—thereby, stripping professors
of First Amendment protection for this speech. However, the issue is far from
settled.
c.

Faculty Curricular Decisions

Professors have certain rights over the content of the curriculum when their
students disagree as to what that content should be.148 In Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, a student, based on her Mormon beliefs, refused to use particular
offensive words or to take God’s name in vain during classroom acting
exercises at the University of Utah’s Actor Training Program.149 The faculty
members told her to “get over” her language issues and she eventually left the
program because she believed that she would have been eventually
dismissed.150 The student challenged the university’s attempt to force her to
use certain words as a violation of her free speech and free exercise rights
under the First Amendment.151 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that this was
“school-sponsored speech,” and as such, the university’s decision to compel
that speech would be upheld as long as its decision was “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”152 The court remanded the case to determine
whether the strict adherence requirement was truly pedagogical or a pretext for
religious discrimination.153 Similarly, in Head v. Board of Trustees of
California State University, a student in San Jose State University’s teaching
credential program challenged the institutionalization of multiculturalism in
the university’s curriculum as a violation of his First Amendment rights—
given that he vehemently disagreed with the tenets of multiculturalism.154 The
court held:
Public university instructors are not required by the First Amendment to
provide class time for students to voice views that contradict the material being
taught or to interfere with instruction or the educational mission. Although the

148. A similar principle applies in the K–12 classroom. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995) (“So long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in
the classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race,
gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere.”).
149. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004).
150. Id. at 1282–83.
151. Id. at 1280.
152. Id. at 1290.
153. Id. at 1293.
154. Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. H029129, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
393, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007).
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First Amendment may require an instructor to allow students to express
opposing views and values to some extent where the instructor invites
expression of students’ personal opinions and ideas, nothing in the First
Amendment prevents an instructor from refocusing classroom discussions and
155
limiting students’ expression to effectively teach.

Both Axon-Flynn and Head cited to Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier156 for the
“legitimate pedagogical concerns” standard.157 Hazelwood was another K–12
case, but it set forth the relevant legal standard in future cases that involved
classroom speech at public universities. This case involved a high school
student’s First Amendment challenge to the removal of two articles in the
school’s newspaper.158 One of the articles dealt with students’ experiences with
pregnancy and the other reported on the impact of divorce on students at the
school.159 Pursuant to the school’s pre-approval procedure, the principal
decided to remove the articles based on concerns about appropriateness and
confidentiality.160 The Court, in finding for the school, held “that educators do
not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”161
When the interests of a professor collide with the interests of a university,
some courts have held that the freedom to determine the curriculum resides
with the university as long as the university’s judgment is consistent with the
Hazelwood principle. In Bishop v. Aronov, an assistant professor of physical
education at the University of Alabama continually referred to his Christian
beliefs during instructional time and organized after-class meetings to further
discuss the relationship of his religious beliefs to human physiology.162 The
university requested that the professor cease the interjection of religion into his

155. Id. at *36. The court also recognized the academic freedom of the institution to
incorporate multiculturalism into its curriculum: “We discern nothing in First Amendment
jurisprudence that precludes a public university from adopting, in its exercise of its academic
freedom, academic standards that must be satisfied by a student seeking a professional teaching
credential even where those standards reflect a certain philosophy of education or academic
viewpoints with which a student vehemently disagrees.” Id. at *44–45.
156. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988).
157. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (“[W]e hold that the Hazelwood framework is applicable
in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”); Head,
2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 393, at *35 (“Student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities may be restricted so long as the restrictions reasonably relate to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”).
158. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
159. Id. at 263.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 273.
162. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (11th Cir. 1991).
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classes and after-class meetings.163 The professor sued the university for
violating his free speech rights.164 The Eleventh Circuit, also relying on the
Hazelwood standard of “legitimate pedagogical concerns,” held, “The
University’s conclusions about course content must be allowed to hold sway
over an individual professor’s judgments.”165 The Court, regarding the concept
of academic freedom, noted:
Though we are mindful of the invaluable role academic freedom plays in our
public schools, particularly at the post-secondary level, we do not find support
to conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.
And, in any event, we cannot supplant our discretion for that of the University.
Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators. In this regard, we trust
that the University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors
in pursuit of academic freedom. University officials are undoubtedly aware
that quality faculty members will be hard to attract and retain if they are to be
166
shackled in much of what they do.

Bishop makes clear the tension between professorial and institutional
freedoms. In this case, the court gave deference to the university in
determining what could be taught over what an individual professor thought
appropriate.167
At least one court has taken the extreme position that state university
professors have no First Amendment interest in determining the curriculum. In
Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania, a tenured professor changed
the course content of a class titled, “Introduction to Educational Media,” by
including new material on bias, censorship, religion, and humanism.168 A
student complained that the professor was using the class to advance religious
ideas.169 The university administration suspended the professor with pay.170
The professor challenged the university on First Amendment and other
constitutional grounds.171 While acknowledging that the proper standard of
review in certain First Amendment challenges involving state university actors
163. Id. at 1069.
164. Id. at 1070.
165. Id. at 1074, 1077.
166. Id. at 1075.
167. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074. The court also noted:
As a place of schooling with a teaching mission, we consider the University’s authority to
reasonably control the content of its curriculum, particularly that content imparted during
class time. Tangential to the authority over its curriculum, there lies some authority over
the conduct of teachers in and out of the classroom that significantly bears on the
curriculum or that gives the appearance of endorsement by the university.
Id.
168. Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir. 1998).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 490.
171. Id.
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was the “legitimate educational interest” test, the court held that such analysis
was unnecessary here because “we conclude that a public university professor
does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the
classroom.”172 That right, the court held, was the exclusive domain of the
university.173
Other courts have held for the professor when universities cancel classes
for reasons that violate the First Amendment. For example, in Dibona v.
Matthews, the Educational Cultural Complex, which is a branch of San Diego
Community College, cancelled a drama class that was planning to use a play
titled “Split Second” about an African American police officer who shoots and
kills a white suspect during the course of an arrest, after the suspect subjects
the officer to a flurry of racial slurs.174 The police officer subsequently planted
a knife in the hand of the victim and fabricated a self-defense justification for
the shooting.175 The college administrators cancelled the class because it did
not want to be subject to opposition from the community and it wanted to
avoid a politically sensitive topic.176 The drama professor along with a student
brought a First Amendment challenge against the college.177 The court, in
ruling for the professor and student, held that the college’s “desire to avoid
‘taking on’ the religious community is clearly an insufficient basis for
cancellation of the class.”178 Further, the court observed:
As to the “politically sensitive” nature of the play’s subject matter, not only is
it a constitutionally inappropriate reason for censorship, ultimately it may also
be counterproductive for the community. A central premise of the
constitutional guaranty of free speech is that difficult and sensitive political
issues generally benefit from constructive dialogue of the sort which might
179
have been generated by “Split Second.”

This does not mean, however, that courts will impose a legal mandate for
equal time for every type of expression imaginable. In his concurring opinion
in Widmar v. Vincent, a case upholding a student religious organization’s right
to use a university facility to conduct its meetings, Justice Stevens noted in this
regard:
Because every university’s resources are limited, an educational institution
must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is
available for extracurricular activities. . . . I should think it obvious, for

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 491.
Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491.
Alan DiBona v. Robert L. Matthews, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 891.
DiBona, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
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example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a
particular time—one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse
an amateur performance of Hamlet—the First Amendment would not require
180
that the room be reserved for the group that submitted its application first.

In other words, universities would still have choices to make in distributing
limited resources.
In summary, a professor’s curriculum choices generally supersede
individual student curriculum preferences, unless these choices are a pretext
for illegal discrimination. However, universities’ curriculum choices typically
trump professorial discretion; even though some courts have found that a
university’s discretion may be limited by free speech principles.
d.

Faculty Grading

Some courts have held that professors have the right to assign grades to
students. For example, in Parate v. Isibor, an associate professor of
engineering at Tennessee State University refused to change the grade from
“B” to “A” of a student whom he caught cheating.181 The university
administration, after retaliating against this professor by constantly berating
him in meetings and criticizing his teaching ability in front of his students on
numerous occasions, eventually terminated him.182 The professor brought a
legal challenge to his termination based partly on his right to academic
freedom.183 In ruling, in part, for the professor, the court recognized, “Because
the assignment of a letter grade is a symbolic communication intended to send
a specific message to the student, the individual professor’s communicative act
is entitled to some measure of First Amendment protection.”184 However, the
court held that even though the university could not compel the professor to
change the grade, thereby forcing him to submit to speech that he did not

180. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Both Dibona
and Widmar raise the issue of students’ free speech rights. Dibona involved a student claiming a
right to see a controversial play, while Widmar involved a student organization’s right to use
university facilities. See supra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. In addition, a number of
cases covered in this chapter, particularly in which professors’ and students’ interest collide,
could also implicate students’ free speech rights. Other issues involving students’ free speech
rights include campus hate speech restrictions such as in Corry v. Stanford, No. 740309 (Cal.
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction) and the use of
student activity fees such as in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217
(2000). While an interesting issue exists on the relationship between student freedom and
professorial freedom, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
181. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 823–24 (6th Cir. 1989).
182. Id. at 825.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 827.
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subscribe, the university retained the ultimate right to change the grade, as an
administrative matter, on its own.185
A different court rejected the reasoning of Parate and went even further in
bolstering the freedom of the institution to determine student grades over the
professor’s freedom to do so. In Brown v. Armenti, a tenured university
professor at California University of Pennsylvania assigned a failing grade to a
student.186 The university ordered the professor to change the grade to an
incomplete, but the professor refused.187 The professor was terminated and
brought suit against the university. The Third Circuit held for the university,
reasoning, “Because grading is pedagogic, the assignment of the grade is
subsumed under the university’s freedom to determine how a course is to be
taught. We therefore conclude that a public university professor does not have
a First Amendment right to expression via the school’s grade assignment
procedures.”188 Similarly, in Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts
University, a professor challenged his termination as a violation of his First
Amendment rights claiming that his contract was not renewed because he
refused to inflate his grades or lower his teaching standards.189 The First
Circuit ruled for the university noting:
To accept plaintiff’s contention that an untenured teacher’s grading policy is
constitutionally protected and insulates him from discharge when his standards
conflict with those of the university would be to constrict the university in
defining and performing its educational mission. The [F]irst [A]mendment
does not require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto
190
himself.

Thus, in both of these cases, courts have found that the university’s educational
judgment superseded an individual professor’s discretion.
Also, when a court determines that a grading conflict between a university
and a professor is over an administrative matter, such as requiring that
professors provide clear reasons for assigned grades, the university typically
wins. For example, in Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, a part-time English lecturer
at the University of Toledo was terminated for refusing to comply with a
request that she communicate more clearly to her students what was required
to complete the coursework for her class.191 Specifically, the professor gave a
grade of “incomplete” to thirteen of seventeen students and informed the
students that their incompletes were assigned for one or more of three reasons:

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 829–30.
Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 75.
Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir. 1986).
Id. at 426.
Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.2d 590, 591 (6th Cir. 2005).
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1) improper formatting; 2) improper citations; and/or 3) required textual
changes. Instead of providing individualized comments to each student, she
left it up to the students to determine which of these reasons applied to their
own situations.192 She claimed that “writing individualized letters would have
interfered with the students’ learning experience and the purpose of the
class.”193 The students complained that they did not know how to proceed and
the administration asked her to send further clarification to the students about
how to receive credit for the course.194 When the professor refused to comply,
she was refused additional teaching assignments.195 The professor challenged
this reprisal on First Amendment grounds.196 The Sixth Circuit held that the
professor’s “First Amendment rights were not implicated” by the university’s
request that she explain how she determined the final grades in her class.197 It
further noted, “The freedom of a university to decide what may be taught and
how it shall be taught would be meaningless if a professor were entitled to
refuse to comply with university requirements whenever they conflict with his
or her teaching philosophy.”198
Additionally, when clear grading procedures are in place, courts are
reluctant to give professors much discretion in deviating from such procedures.
For example, in Wozniak v. Conry, the university required professors to grade
on a prescribed curve and submit their grading materials for review.199 An
engineering professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in an
act of defiance, refused to submit his grading materials in purposeful violation
of this requirement.200 The professor ignored a number of requests for
explanation by the university.201 While retaining him on the payroll, the
university subsequently stripped the professor of his professorial
responsibilities and privileges.202 The professor brought a challenge in court. In
ruling for the university, the Seventh Circuit recognized, “Universities are
entitled to assure themselves that their evaluation systems have been followed;
otherwise their credentials are meaningless.”203
192. Id. at 591–92.
193. Id. at 592.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 593.
196. Johnson-Kurek, 423 F.2d at 593.
197. Id. at 594–95.
198. Id. at 595.
199. Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2001).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 891. The court recognized:
Some universities offer their faculty more control over grading than the University of
Illinois afforded [the professor], and maybe discretion is good. But competition among
systems of evaluation at different universities, not federal judges, must settle the question
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In sum, some courts have acknowledged professors’ rights to assign
grades, while others have deemed this right as belonging to the university.
Courts that acknowledge that the right resides with the professor also recognize
that the university can change grades on student transcripts as an
administrative act. Finally, some courts are reluctant to give professors any
discretion around grading when clear university grading guidelines are in
place.
e.

Freedom for Faculty Research

Freedom for faculty research has not fared well in the courts especially
when this interest has been weighed against state and federal laws that conflict
with such freedom. I will summarize the law in two areas: faculty internet
usage and travel for research purposes.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore highlighted an
extremely restricted view of a professor’s freedom to conduct internet
research.204 Urofsky involved a challenge to a Virginia state law that banned
state employees from accessing “sexually explicit content” on their work
computers without prior approval from a state agency head.205 A number of
public university scholars from institutions located in Virginia sued in federal
court in order to challenge the law on First Amendment academic freedom
grounds.206 The Fourth Circuit held that the state has the power to “control the
manner in which its employees discharge their duties and to direct its
employees to undertake the responsibilities of their positions in a specified
way.”207 It recognized no exception for state university professors. It further
held that “to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of ‘academic
freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen
is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors, and
is not violated by the terms of the Act.”208 Not all of the sitting judges were
convinced by this rationale. Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s concurring
opinion, for example, offered some solace to proponents of academic

which approach is best. Each university may decide for itself how the authority to assign
grades is allocated within its faculty.
Id.
204. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414–15 (4th Cir. 2000). Note that this is a preGarcetti case.
205. Id. at 405. When the Fourth Circuit decided the case, the state law defined “sexually
explicit content” to include “(i) any description of or (ii) any picture, photograph, drawing,
motion picture film, digital image or similar visual representation depicting sexual bestiality, a
lewd exhibition of nudity, . . . sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, . . .
[and] coprophilia, urophilia, or fetishism.” Id.
206. Id. at 405–06.
207. Id. at 409.
208. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
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freedom.209 Although he agreed with the majority’s result, he disagreed with its
reasoning.210 Wilkinson warned, “By embracing the Commonwealth’s view
that all work-related speech by public employees is beyond public concern, the
majority sanctions state legislative interference in public universities without
limit.”211
In another case, Loving v. Boren, a professor at the University of
Oklahoma challenged the university’s decision to implement a policy to
restrict a number of news groups being accessed through the university’s news
server.212 The university developed this policy because it was concerned about
violating a state law that made it a felony to “distribute . . . any obscene or
indecent writing, paper, book, picture, photograph, motion picture, figure, form
or any description or any type of obscene material.”213 Although the professor
did not specifically claim that the university ban interfered with his right to
conduct research, the implications of such a ban on research freedom are clear.
In response to the professor’s challenge, the university implemented a new
policy in which the university created two news servers.214 The “A” server
only allowed access to news groups approved by the university.215 The “B”
server, on the other hand, allowed full access to all news groups.216 To access
the “B” server, the user had to be over the age of eighteen and was required to
click a box that denoted acceptance of certain rules of usage including a
restriction that the “B” server be used solely for academic and research
purposes.217 The court held that this new policy was constitutional and,
therefore, the professor’s claim was moot.218 The court also held that the
professor’s claim was further moot because the blocked news groups on the
“A” server could be accessed on university computers in alternative ways.219
In a different research-related context, Emergency Coalition to Defend
Educational Travel v. United States Department of the Treasury involved

209. Wilkinson is a former law professor and governing board member of the University of
Virginia. O’NEIL, supra note 8, at 198.
210. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 426 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Wilkinson applied the Pickering
test and found that the balancing of the competing interests in this case weighed in the State’s
favor. Id. at 431–35. Under the majority decision, since First Amendment rights were not
implicated, the Pickering balancing test was not performed. Id. at 409 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 429–30.
212. Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953, 954 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 955.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Loving, 956 F. Supp. at 955.
218. Id.
219. The court remained puzzled by these unspecified alternative means of access, but
nonetheless agreed “that the fact of alternative routes to reach the blocked news groups does
make Plaintiff’s claim moot.” Id. at 956.
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federal restrictions for travel to Cuba.220 An association of academics, two
college professors, and three undergraduates challenged the restrictions as a
violation of their academic freedom rights.221 The plaintiffs claimed that the
“restrictions on U.S. academic programs in Cuba unconstitutionally violate
their rights to academic freedom under the First Amendment . . . and their
rights to travel internationally for First Amendment purposes.”222 The D.C.
Circuit, in ruling for the government, held that the purpose of the restrictions
was to curtail tourism in Cuba so, therefore, was a constitutionally permissible,
content-neutral law.223
Thus, courts seem reluctant to protect a professor’s freedom to conduct
research on the internet if this freedom conflicts with state or federal
legislation. Further, deference is given to laws that restrict access to certain
countries—even if these laws potentially inhibit a professor’s ability to
conduct scholarly research.
In conclusion, the seminal cases of institutional academic freedom arose
from challenges to government authority during the McCarthy era. In all of
these cases, institutional interests were aligned with professorial interests
against the overreaching of state authority. The judicial opinions, thus, did not
acknowledge any distinction between professorial and institutional rights. On
the other hand, in cases where professorial and institutional interests diverged,
courts used First Amendment principles to decide the disputes. When it comes
to professorial free speech rights, the outcomes have been mixed. When
professors conflict with their universities, some cases have held for professors
on particular issues, while others have given great deference to universities.
What this conflicting judicial language on the protection of various scholarly
activities tells us is that there is no strong consensus on these matters. And this
has been true for most of the five categories of professorial protection outlined
above.

220. Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 6
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 8.
223. Id. at 13.
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PART II: THE LIMITATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
A.

The Limitations of Academic Freedom Based on the First Amendment
1.

Conceptual Inconsistency: Institutional Autonomy Versus Professorial
Rights

Legal scholars have analyzed the principles arising from constitutional
academic freedom in a number of law review articles. These articles generally
emphasize the tension between institutional academic freedom and its
professorial counterpart—particularly in cases where professorial and
institutional interests conflict. In this Section, I will briefly summarize two
diverging views.
On the one hand, J. Peter Byrne argues that institutional autonomy rather
than individual professorial rights is the proper focus of academic freedom.224
Byrne criticizes how “academic freedom has been thought to encompass all
First Amendment rights exercisable on a campus or by members of the
academic community.”225 He articulates a distinction between “academic
freedom” and “constitutional academic freedom”—the former being “a nonlegal term referring to the liberties claimed by professors through professional
channels against administrative or political interference with research,
teaching, and governance” and the latter being “the insulation of scholarship
and liberal education from extramural political interference.”226 He argues for a
very limited role for courts in protecting faculty from their schools and
contends that the proper locus for constitutional academic freedom lies with
the university from external interference and not with individual professors.227
In support of his arguments, Byrne cites the history of judicial abstention in
matters of university decision-making and the existence of state constitutional
provisions that shield universities from undue government interference.228
Other scholars support this view of academic freedom residing in the
institution. For example, Paul Horowitz argues for expanded First Amendment
protections for institutional autonomy.229 He contends that universities should
have considerable discretion to define “what their academic mission requires,
and their own sense of what academic freedom entails, rather than evaluate
those claims against a top-down, judicially imposed understanding of academic
224. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99
YALE L.J. 251, 312 (1989).
225. Id. at 262.
226. Id. at 255.
227. See id. at 306–09.
228. Id. at 323–27.
229. Paul Horowitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and
Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2007).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

494

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:461

freedom.”230 Also, Lawrence Rosenthal argues that Garcetti properly
recognized the “managerial prerogative” of public employers to control the
speech of their employees—even at public universities.231 Rosenthal contends
“the First Amendment law of managerial prerogative tolerates regulation of
speech within the university as long as that regulation represents a bona fide
professional judgment of academic merit consistent with scholarly norms.”232
According to Rosenthal, academic freedom resides with the university’s
judgment of academic merit and not with the discretion of individual
professors.
On the other hand, David M. Rabban contends that both institutional
autonomy and professorial rights are protected under the broad umbrella of
academic freedom.233 Rabban argues that even though courts have been
presented with more institutional claims throughout history, they have
nonetheless addressed the professorial counterpart.234 With this as his starting
point, he contends that the concept of academic freedom moves beyond
professionally defined norms and implicates First Amendment rights. He
states, “Asserting constitutional protection for professors and universities is not
simply a form of special pleading to elevate the job-related concerns of a
particular profession or the institutional interests of a particular enterprise.
Rather, constitutional academic freedom promotes first amendment values of
general concern to all citizens in a democracy.”235 He concludes by arguing for
a “functional justification” of constitutional academic freedom based on the
distinctive roles of professors and universities in American society.236
Similarly, other scholars support the notion that academic freedom should
focus on professors—or at least not focus so much on institutions. For
example, Matthew W. Finkin contends that prior judicial interpretations of
institutional academic freedom threaten the constitutional protections of
individual professors.237 Finkin states:
The theory of “institutional” academic freedom would provide institutional
authority with more than a prudential claim to judicial deference; it provides a
constitutional shield against interventions that would not ordinarily seem

230. Id. at 1547–48.
231. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 33 (2008).
232. Id. at 105.
233. David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic
Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 230.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Matthew W. Finkin, On “Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 853–
54 (1982–83).
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inappropriate, for example, judicial intervention on behalf of a faculty whose
238
civil or academic rights had been infringed by the institution.

In these situations of proper judicial intervention, Finkin rejects the idea that
academic freedom lies solely with the institution and argues that it should
protect individual professors as well.239 Richard H. Hiers goes even further and
argues that the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of institutional
academic freedom is incorrect because it is based on Justice Powell’s flawed
opinion in Bakke.240 Hiers contends that contrary to Powell’s assertions, the
U.S. Supreme Court has never before ruled that the First Amendment protected
institutional academic freedom rights. He states:
Arguably, as “expressive association,” academic institutions may invoke First
Amendment academic freedom protections on behalf of their faculty and
students. Courts may certainly defer to the expert judgment of academicians,
or even recognize institutional autonomy “within constitutionally prescribed
limits” whether as a matter of sound public policy or as an important state
interest. But none of these propositions is the same as saying that colleges,
universities or their professional schools, themselves, are entitled to the
enjoyment of either academic freedom or autonomy under the First
241
Amendment.

Therefore, according to Hiers, any modern ruling relying on Bakke or its
progeny for the existence of institutional academic freedom is mistaken.
Some scholars, therefore, argue that constitutional academic freedom
should center on institutions, while other scholars disagree and focus on
professorial freedom. Given the conflicting judicial interpretations that lend
support to both views, a simple resolution based on constitutional law
principles seems unlikely. These issues are made even more complicated based
on the state actor requirement for First Amendment claims.
2.

The State Action Doctrine and Academic Freedom

The full text of the First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”242 While originally only applicable to laws passed by Congress
and not individual states, courts would later hold that the First Amendment

238. Id. at 851.
239. Id. at 852.
240. Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom or Autonomy Grounded Upon the
First Amendment: A Jurisprudential Mirage, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 13 (2007).
241. Id. at 57–58 (footnotes omitted).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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applies to the states through the Due Process Clause.243 Only government
actors, therefore, are legally required to comply with the First Amendment.
This is known as the state action doctrine.244 When the government is acting
against a university, then state action is implicated in a constitutional claim.
This is true whether the university is public or private. However, when a
university is acting against its own faculty members, a court must determine
whether or not the institution is a state actor before constitutional analysis can
proceed.245 This state action inquiry is a threshold matter—i.e., an essential
first step—for constitutional claims. If the court determines that the university
is not a state actor, then the constitutional analysis ends.
Implicit in this doctrine is the policy decision to provide limits, based on
constitutional restrictions, on unfettered government authority. This is why a
reviewing court’s first inquiry for constitutional purposes will be to determine
the level of government involvement in the disputed decision. A purely private
decision will not be protected by the Constitution, while a purely public
decision will be held to judicial scrutiny. The state action doctrine creates a
strange result for academic freedom cases in which their holdings, when based
on First Amendment principles, only apply to state universities or private
universities if they are deemed to be acting as state actors. But why does it
make sense that academic freedom is constitutionally protected at a public
institution but not at its private counterpart—especially when both higher
educational institutions operate for the benefit of the public? In the following
sections, I will analyze the legal contours of the public versus private
distinction in order to problematize the concept for academic freedom
purposes.
a.

The Murky Distinction Between Public and Private Actors Under the
State Action Doctrine

An infinite variety of institutional arrangements, in terms of public versus
private, exist in American higher education, and these arrangements change
over time. Harvard and Yale Universities, for example, began with substantial
public support in terms of land and funding, even though they would consider
themselves private today.246 Similarly, Tulane University started out as a
public institution called the University of Louisiana, but evolved to the private

243. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
244. See Wilson R. Huhn, State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1383–86 (2006).
245. See, e.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1968) (analyzing whether the New
York State College of Ceramics was a state actor).
246. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY 220 (1997).
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institution it is today.247 On the other hand, Rutgers started out as a private
institution but ended up as a state university.248 Other universities are hybrids
that retain both public and private characteristics. For example, private-charter
institutions like Howard University, University of Pittsburgh, and Temple
University receive substantial public funding, while public-charter institutions
like the Universities of Delaware and Vermont demonstrate many private
qualities.249 MIT, which is private, has been the beneficiary of federal landgrant support since 1862 and Cornell University, which is also private,
contains four statutory colleges that are state-funded as part of the State
University of New York.250 Because of this infinite possibility of
arrangements, a simple private versus public dichotomy is inadequate to trigger
constitutional protection. Instead, courts query the level of state involvement in
the challenged action before constitutional protection is triggered. William A.
Kaplin and Barbara A. Lee observe:
Due to varying patterns of government assistance and involvement, a
continuum exists, ranging from the obvious public institution (such as a taxsupported state university) to the obvious private institution (such as a
religious seminary). The gray area between these poles is a subject of
continuing debate about how much the government must be involved in the
affairs of a “private” institution or one of its programs before it will be
251
considered “public” for the purposes of the “state action” doctrine.

In the landmark state action case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance.”252 In Burton, an African American customer
challenged a private restaurant owner’s refusal of service, based on the
customer’s race, on constitutional grounds.253 The restaurant was located in a
public parking garage owned by a state entity and profits from the restaurant
benefited the state.254 The Court found state action in the restaurant owner’s

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.; David J. Staley, Democratizing American Higher Education: The Legacy of the
Morrill Land Grant Act, ORIGINS (Jan. 2013), http://origins.osu.edu/article/democratizingamerican-higher-education-legacy-morrill-land-grant-act.
251. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING 42–
43 (4th ed. 2006).
252. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
253. Id. at 716.
254. Id. at 716–19.
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refusal of service.255 Subsequent cases would engage in such context-specific
factual sifting to determine if state action was present.
In an early case regarding the state action issue in a private university
context, Powe v. Miles, seven students at Alfred University, some of whom
were studying at the New York State College of Ceramics, were dismissed for
disrupting an awards ceremony during parents’ weekend.256 The students
challenged their dismissal on constitutional grounds.257 The university
subsequently moved to dismiss based on the lack of state action on the case.258
The Second Circuit dismissed the claims against the private entity, Alfred
University; however, it ruled that the actions of the College of Ceramics
constituted state action.259 In finding state action at the College of Ceramics,
the court noted:
The State pays all the direct expenses of the College (sometimes hereafter CC).
In addition it pays a stipulated sum per credit hour for courses taken by CC
students in “the private sector,” with a corresponding payment by the latter for
instruction CC gives students in other colleges. The State reimburses Alfred
for a pro rata share of the entire administrative expense of the University
including the salaries of the President, the Dean of Students, and other general
260
officers, utilities and overhead.

The court also observed that the “very name of the college identifies it as a
state institution,” and proceeded to list the numerous ways in which the
College of Ceramics was enmeshed in state laws regarding its funding and
operation.261 It noted:
The State furnishes the land, buildings and equipment; it meets and evidently
expects to continue to meet the entire budget; it requires that all receipts be
credited against that budget, Education Law § 6102; and in the last analysis it
can tell Alfred not simply what to do but how to do it. . . . The control of these
student protests by the President and the Dean of Students on behalf of the
262
State is an instance of positive state involvement, whether obvious or not.

The State of New York was, thus, so linked with the funding and operation of
the College of Ceramics that the Second Circuit held that state action was
present.
Other cases would make it harder to claim state action at private
universities. For example, in Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, a

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 724.
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 77–79 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 76.
Powe, 407 F.2d at 82–83.
Id. at 83.
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federal trial court found no state action at Columbia University.263 Grossner
involved students who brought a constitutional challenge to their disciplinary
proceedings which were instituted as punishment for their involvement in a
series of sit-ins.264 The students claimed the university’s receipt of substantial
government funding created a state actor.265 The court, however, found no state
action since “there [was] nothing . . . to suggest any substantial or relevant
degree of interconnection between the State and the University.”266 It further
noted that “receipt of money from the State is not, without a good deal more,
enough to make the recipient an agency or instrumentality of the
Government.”267 In Blackburn v. Fisk University, twelve students of Fisk
University, which is a private institution located in Nashville, Tennessee,
brought a constitutional challenge to their summary suspensions.268 The Sixth
Circuit found that no state action was present.269 It observed, “State
involvement sufficient to transform a ‘private’ university into a ‘State’
university requires more than merely chartering the university; providing
financial aid in the form of public funds; or granting of tax exemptions.”270 In
another case, Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, two law students at a private
law school in New York challenged their dismissals on free speech grounds
claiming that they were punished for their anti-war activities.271 The students
contended that state action was present because the law school served a public
function, the law school provided a path to state regulated bar admission, and
the school received state aid and resources.272 The court, rejecting these
arguments, found no state action.273
Not all courts reached the same conclusion during this time. In Rackin v.
University of Pennsylvania, for example, a professor of English challenged her
department’s denial of her tenure application claiming that the decision was
motivated by unlawful gender discrimination.274 The federal trial court found
that the University of Pennsylvania was a state actor.275 It relied on the
extensive interdependence between government and the university, including
263. Grossner v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
264. Id. at 538.
265. Id. at 546–47.
266. Id. at 548.
267. Id. at 547–48.
268. Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 122 (6th Cir. 1971).
269. Id. at 124.
270. Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
271. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 478 F.2d 1137, 1139–40 (2d Cir. 1973).
272. Id. at 1140–42.
273. Id. at 1140; see also Krohn v. Harvard Law Sch., 552 F.2d 21, 23–25 (1st Cir. 1977)
(finding no state action at Harvard Law School even though historic connections existed between
the school and the state and legal education was currently regulated by the state).
274. Rackin v. Univ. of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
275. Id. at 1004.
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the Commonwealth’s long-standing financial support, state construction,
leasing and financing of university buildings, federal construction grants and
contracts, public funding of research projects, tax exemptions and benefits,
state scholarships and loan aid, university development agreements with the
state, and other linkages.276 The court observed:
This symbiosis becomes readily apparent when one considers the give and take
relationship which has developed between the University and the
Commonwealth principally because of the University’s financial dependence
upon the Commonwealth. . . . The Commonwealth, in effect, maintains a
stranglehold on the University and therefore potentially has significant input
277
into University policies.

In Wahba v. New York University, on the other hand, an associate professor of
biochemistry at the NYU School of Medicine challenged the university’s
decision to remove him from work on a research project funded by federal
grants.278 The Second Circuit weighed a number of factors to determine if state
action was present, including “the degree of government involvement, the
offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of preserving a private sector free
from the constitutional requirements applicable to government institutions.”279
After balancing these factors, the court found no state action to carry
constitutional protections over to the university’s dealings with this
professor.280 Similarly, in Greenya v. George Washington University, an
English instructor at the U.S. Naval School of Hospital Administration, who
taught mostly naval officers, challenged his termination from teaching.281 The
university provided these courses to the Navy under a contractual
agreement.282 The professor argued that since he taught government employees
at government facilities, the university acted as a state actor.283 The court
found no state action, observing:
Our conclusions are predicated on the absence of any showing . . . that the
Federal or District of Columbia Government has exercised any role in the
management of George Washington University or has adopted a pervasive
scheme of statutes, codes, and conditions which has the effect of regulating in
detail the University’s management. While the determination of how much
governmental involvement is necessary before a private institution is subject to
constitutional limitations must be made on a case by case basis, we are clear
that the mere receipt of government loans or funding by an otherwise private

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 996–1002.
Id. at 1004–05.
Wahba v. N.Y. Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 102.
Id.
Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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university is not sufficient involvement to trigger constitutional guarantees in
284
the University’s relations with its employees.

Arising from the multifaceted balancing of interests contained in the early
cases, the Supreme Court subsequently articulated three specific tests to
determine whether state action is present: (1) the symbiotic relationship test;
(2) the nexus test; and (3) the public function test.285 First, the symbiotic
relationship test seeks to determine the nature of the contacts between the
private entity and the state. The foundational case for this test, Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, noted that the question was whether “[t]he
State has so far insulated itself into a position of interdependence with [the
institution] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been . . . ‘purely
private.’”286 Under a finding of state action under this test, since the private
entity’s actions are so interdependent on the government, a specified state
linkage to the action need not be shown. Second, and narrower than the
symbiotic relation test, the nexus test focuses on the level of state involvement
in the particular act being challenged. According to the seminal case for this
test, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the question “must be whether there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
[private] entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.”287 In an important state action case involving the nexus test as
applied to nursing homes, the Court observed:
[O]ur precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in
288
law be deemed to be that of the State.

The nexus, thus, focuses on the state’s specific involvement in the challenged
decision. Third, the public function test focuses on the nature of the private
entity’s particular function as compared to the traditional role of the state. The
Court in Jackson observed that the function must be one that is “traditionally

284. Id. at 561.
285. In addition to the symbiotic relation, nexus, and public function tests, a separate
approach was articulated in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.
531 U.S. 288 (2001). In Brentwood, a secondary school sued a not-for-profit athletic association
for unconstitutionally imposing sanctions against the school. Id. at 293. The Court defined a new
standard of “pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in [the private
entity’s] composition and workings.” Id. at 298. The Court, applying this test, found state action
in this case. In the private university state action cases, most courts still apply the symbiotic
relation and nexus tests. Id. at 302.
286. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
287. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
288. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (finding no state action at private nursing
homes).
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exclusively reserved to the State. . . . [and] traditionally associated with
sovereignty.”289 This test was so narrowly defined in Jackson that many
subsequent cases have focused on the other two approaches.
In applying these state action tests, more recent cases involving private
educational contexts have been decided both ways—finding state action in
some cases and no state action in others. In a leading education-specific state
action case, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, a number of teachers at a private school
for troubled high school students challenged their dismissals for opposing
school policy as in violation of their constitutional rights.290 The teachers
argued that the school was a state actor because it received at least ninety
percent of its funding from public subsidies and was subject to both state and
local regulations.291 The Court, applying the nexus, symbiotic relation, and
public function tests, found no state action when the school dismissed its
employees.292 Similarly, in State v. Schmid, a member of the U.S. Labor Party,
who was distributing political materials on the main campus of Princeton
University and who was not enrolled as a student there, challenged his arrest
and criminal charge for trespass.293 The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the
symbiotic relation, nexus, and public function tests in analyzing whether or not
state action was present.294 It ultimately found that the issue of state action was
unclear for purposes of the U.S. Constitution.295 On the other hand, in two
consolidated cases, the court reached a different result when employees of both
the University of Pittsburgh and Temple University sued their schools on
constitutional grounds.296 The University of Pittsburgh argued that although it
was part of the state’s system of higher education, the state did not control its
tenure decisions—hence, no state action was present.297 And Temple argued
that, as a private university, the state had no control over its decisions.298 The
court, applying the symbiotic and nexus tests, disagreed with the universities
and found that state action existed at both places.299 In distinguishing the facts
of Rendell-Baker, the court noted that for both Pittsburgh and Temple, the
institutions were required by law to: (1) allow the state to control how state

289. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352–53.
290. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832, 834 (1982).
291. Id. at 832–33.
292. Id. at 836, 840–43.
293. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 616 (N.J. 1980).
294. Id. at 620, 622.
295. Id. at 624. But note that the court found state action under the New Jersey state
constitution. Id. at 633.
296. Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh and Schier v. Temple Univ., 742 F.2d 94, 96–97 (3d Cir.
1984).
297. Id. at 96.
298. Id. at 97.
299. Id. at 103.
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funding would be used at the universities; (2) submit state-sponsored audits or
make yearly reports to the state; and (3) allow the state to appoint one-third of
their trustees.300 Indeed, the linkages between the state and the schools were so
strong that the court observed “it would require a legislative enactment to
disentangle Temple and Pitt from the Commonwealth.”301 As such, the
symbiotic relation and nexus tests were satisfied at both institutions with
regard to the challenged decisions.
In Smith v. Duquesne University, on the other hand, a doctoral student in
English challenged his dismissal from his program on constitutional
grounds.302 The federal trial court, relying on the symbiotic relation and nexus
tests, found no state action in the case.303 As to the symbiotic relation test, the
court observed that “there [was] no statutory interrelationship between the state
and Duquesne University: the state does not participate in the management or
operation of Duquesne, review the institution’s expenditures, nor require the
institution to submit voluminous financial reports to the state.”304 In applying
the nexus test, the court then observed, “The decision to expel Smith, like the
decision to matriculate him, turned on an academic judgment made by a purely
private institution according to its official university policy. If indirect
involvement is insufficient to establish state action, then certainly the lack of
any involvement cannot suffice.”305 Similarly, in Imperiale v. Hahnemann
University, a doctor challenged the university’s decision to revoke his medical
degree.306 The court, in applying the symbiotic relation and nexus tests, found
no state action by Hahnemann University.307 And in Logan v. Bennington
College Corp., in a case where a professor challenged his dismissal for sexual
harassment on due process grounds, the court found no state action under the
nexus test.308 The court noted, “His termination was neither imposed by the
acts of state officials acting alone or in concert with College officials, nor
imposed by Bennington in the belief that it was required by law.”309
However, in other cases, courts have found state action at private
universities. In Doe v. Gonzaga University, a former education student sued
Gonzaga on civil rights grounds claiming that the university spread false
allegations that he had sexually assaulted another student.310 The student won
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at trial and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s finding of state
action, holding “[w]here there is joint action of the sort described at trial, the
jury had substantial evidence to find that action under color of state law is
present.”311 Further, in Craft v. Vanderbilt University, the former subjects of
experiments involving the not-consented-to exposure of radioactive iron
isotopes sued the university under federal civil rights laws.312 The federal
district court, under the symbiotic relation test, found that a reasonable jury
could have found that Vanderbilt was a state actor.313 It noted, “The two parties
appear to have cooperatively agreed to combine their respective nutrition study
efforts to promote public welfare and avoid conflict or duplication of efforts
. . . .”314
The inconsistency of results regarding the state action doctrine in higher
education is a reflection of the almost infinite variation of public and private
institutions around the country. On one end of the spectrum, institutions such
as University of Pittsburgh and Temple University have been found to have
such pervasive overlap with government that they have been deemed an
instrumentality of the state. On the other end, institutions such as Duquesne
have had such little government involvement in its affairs that constitutional
protections have been held inapplicable on their campuses. Other cases have
fallen somewhere in between. In all of these cases, mere state funding has not
been enough to establish state action; but public subsidies along with some
degree of state governance over campus affairs can tip the scales toward
finding state action. With respect to protecting academic freedom at American
universities, this state action inquiry leaves much to be desired. Evan G. S.
Siegel, in an article about free student speech on college campuses, critiques
state action analysis for purposes of academic freedom, observing:
The educational mission of a university, whether public or private, includes the
promotion of the free exchange of ideas, the pursuit of knowledge, and a
tolerance of diversity in opinion. Few institutions better exemplify “the
marketplace of ideas.” A student who chooses to attend a private college
instead of an equally reputable state university assumes that he will receive at
least the same quality of education and expects that he will enjoy the same
315
kind of freedom and independence he would have at a public institution.

In other words, why should academic freedom be protected on some campuses
and not others simply based on the degree of state involvement on campus

311. Id. at 396, 401–02.
312. Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 786, 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
313. Id. at 793.
314. Id.
315. Evan G. S. Siegel, Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The
Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1387–88
(1990) (footnotes omitted).
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decision-making? Are there other ways of protecting professorial rights at both
public and private universities?
In the next section, I will explore some areas of state law that collapse the
public/private distinction to illustrate such alternative, albeit state-specific,
legal mechanisms. I am not arguing for the deletion of the state action
requirement in First Amendment analysis. Instead, I am exploring different
legal mechanisms that would apply to both public and private universities.
b.

Examples of Special State Laws That Apply to Both Public and
Private Universities

Not all laws treat public- and private-entity universities differently. Indeed,
some laws actually collapse the distinction between public and private in order
to ensure fairness in both types of institutions. These laws are not restricted in
their application by the state actor requirement. They, therefore, treat both state
and private actors in the same manner. The relevant inquiry under these laws is
whether the challenged action itself is legal, and not the level of state
involvement of the actor. In this section, I will give two unique examples
arising under state laws.
i.

Article 78 Proceedings in New York

Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) provides
for an expedited court proceeding against a body or officer.316 The law defines
“body or officer” as “every court, tribunal, board, corporation, officer, or other
person, or aggregation of persons, whose action may be affected by a
proceeding under this article.”317 And the questions that can be raised at the
proceeding include, in relevant part:
1. [W]hether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by
law; or
2. [W]hether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to
proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. [W]hether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was
affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty
318
or discipline imposed . . . .

While Article 78 proceedings typically arise from challenges to government
action, private entities—including private universities—are not immune from
them. In the oft-cited case of Gray v. Canisius College of Buffalo, the New
York appellate court noted:

316. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801–06 (McKinney 2008).
317. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7802 (McKinney 2008).
318. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 2008).
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Historically, a writ of mandamus has been made applicable to corporations,
both public and private, because these institutions are creations of the
government and a supervisory or visitorial power is always impliedly reserved
to see that corporations act agreeably to the end of the institution, that they
keep within the limits of their lawful powers, and to correct and punish abuses
of their franchises. These corporations, having accepted a charter and having
thus become a quasi-governmental body can be compelled in an article 78
proceeding to fulfill not only obligations imposed upon them by state or
municipal statutes but also those imposed by their internal rules. Thus, courts
have traditionally reviewed the action of private colleges and universities in
cases where it was alleged that the institution had failed to follow its own
hearing or review procedures in the discipline of a student or the dismissal of
319
a faculty member.

Unlike the state action doctrine for purposes of constitutional analysis,
therefore, Article 78 treats private universities as per se quasi-governmental
entities that are subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with their own
internal rules and other legal duties. In Gray, a tenured professor and chair of
the elementary education department at Canisius College challenged her
termination of employment.320 She claimed that the college unfairly dismissed
her because she commenced criminal proceedings against one of her
colleagues that cast her employer and the colleague in a negative light.321 The
professor was terminated after the colleague was found not guilty after a bench
trial.322 Her subsequent Article 78 petition was dismissed by the trial court;
however, the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision.323
The Fourth Department ordered the proceeding to go forward “to determine
whether respondents’ action in terminating Dr. Gray’s services violated the
college rules and was arbitrary and capricious, i.e., whether the respondents
complied with their own rules concerning tenure and properly exercised their
discretion in terminating Dr. Gray’s services.”324
In Gertler v. Goodgold, a tenured faculty member at NYU School of
Medicine challenged his termination based on contract and tort theories.325 The
court found no duty in contract or tort for NYU to be liable under those
theories and held that the professor should have commenced an Article 78
proceeding instead.326 The court noted:

319. Gray v. Canisius Coll. of Buffalo, 430 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Id. at 164.
321. Id. at 167.
322. Id. at 164–65.
323. Id. at 168.
324. Gray, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
325. Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
326. Id. at 569–70, 572.
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[H]aving accepted a State charter and being subject to the broad policy-making
jurisdiction of the Regents of the University of the State of New York, a single
corporate entity of which they are deemed a part, private colleges and
universities are accountable in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, with its welldefined standards of judicial review, for the proper discharge of their self327
imposed as well as statutory obligations.

The court further observed that “the judgment of professional educators is
subject to judicial scrutiny to the extent that the appropriate inquiry may be
made to determine whether they abided by their own rules, and whether they
have acted in good faith or their action was arbitrary or irrational.”328
However, since the four-month statute of limitations for commencing Article
78 proceedings had expired, the professor was ultimately left without a legal
venue to pursue his claims.329
Similarly, in Maas v. Cornell University, a tenured psychology professor
sued Cornell, challenging the disciplinary action against him for breaching the
university’s sexual harassment policy.330 The professor sued on contract and
tort grounds; however, the court found no duty imposed by Cornell based on
these theories.331 The court held that the professor should have brought an
Article 78 proceeding against this private university, but he was now timebarred from doing so.332 Another recent case reached a similar result. In
Padiyar v. Albert Einstein College of Medicine, a student sued his medical
school, a private entity, for its decision to terminate him as a candidate from its
joint M.D./Ph.D. program.333 The student couched his claims in unlawful
discrimination and breach of contract terms.334 The court held that the student
should have brought an Article 78 proceeding instead, but he was now timebarred from doing so.335
Article 78’s treatment of private universities is illustrative of how the
public versus private distinction does not have to be determinative in deciding
whether or not a court has the authority to intervene in a dispute. New York’s
law has a much broader view of when judicial review over a private
university’s actions is proper than the federal state action doctrine allows.
Indeed, based on Article 78 case law, jurisdiction is proper as long as the

327. Id. at 569–70 (citations omitted).
328. Id. at 570.
329. Id.
330. Maas v. Cornell Univ., 721 N.E.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. 1999).
331. Id. at 967–68, 970.
332. Id. at 969.
333. Padiyar v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva Univ., No. 116296/06, 2009 WL
1136795, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2009).
334. Padiyar v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva Univ., 900 N.Y.S.2d 866, 866 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010).
335. Id.
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private university promulgates its own rules—a condition that is almost always
satisfied. This expansive jurisdiction over both public and private entities
indicates a certain policy choice that runs counter to the federal state action
doctrine. Specifically, for Article 78 purposes, ensuring that both public and
private institutions are being fair takes priority over restricting unfettered state
authority.
ii.

The Leonard Law in California

State legislatures can also address whether they will impose different rules
on public and private universities. For example, in California, the legislature
passed a law that collapsed the distinction for First Amendment purposes. The
Leonard Law provides, in pertinent part:
No private postsecondary educational institution shall make or enforce any rule
subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct
that is speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside the
campus or facility of a private postsecondary institution, is protected from
governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United States
336
Constitution . . . .

The Leonard Law allows a private cause of action for students who are harmed
by a violation of this law and authorizes attorney’s fees for a prevailing
plaintiff. The law exempts institutions controlled by religious organizations.
This statute is California’s attempt to provide free speech protection at private
universities.
One of the first litigated challenges brought under the Leonard Law was
Corry v. Stanford University. In Corry, a number of university students sued to
challenge Stanford’s speech code.337 Stanford’s speech code was “intended to
clarify the point at which free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory
harassment begins.”338 Prohibited speech included “discriminatory intimidation
by threats of violence and also . . . personal vilification of students on the basis
of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and
ethnic origin.”339 The code defined speech as constituting personal vilification
if it:
a) [I]s intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their race, sex, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) [I]s addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or
stigmatizes; and

336. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 1992).
337. Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309, at 1, 4 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
338. Id. at 2.
339. Id.
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Two main issues emerged during the litigation. The first issue was whether
the speech code was constitutional. Stanford argued that the speech restricted
by its code was not protected by the First Amendment.341 Instead, the
restrictions targeted only “fighting words,” which are not protected by the
Constitution under the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.342 On the other hand, the students argued that the speech code
impaired their First Amendment rights, as applied to Stanford under the
Leonard Law.343 The second issue was whether the Leonard Law was
constitutional. Stanford argued, among other things, that as an institution of
higher education, it is protected by academic freedom to be free from state
infringement on its educational decisions—including the creation of a
respectful campus atmosphere.344 The students, on the other hand, argued that
the Leonard Law was a valid exercise of the state’s power to regulate the
protection of free speech on a private campus.345
The court held for the students on both issues.346 First, the court analyzed
the speech code under the fighting words doctrine and determined that it did
not seek to limit only fighting words, but “particular ideas and constitutionally
protected speech.”347 Further, the court noted that cases after Chaplinsky
narrowed the fighting words doctrine to prohibit intentional speech that would
“likely cause an imminent breach of the peace.”348 It held that the code was
overly broad in that it barred speech that may just hurt feelings and not
produce imminent violence.349 In other words, since the code was neither
content-neutral nor outcome-specific, it did not pass constitutional muster.
Next, the court analyzed the constitutionality of the Leonard Law.350 I making
short shrift of Stanford’s academic freedom argument, the court observed:

340. Id.
341. Id. at 3.
342. Corry, No. 740309, at 3. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569–72,
574 (1942) (holding that fighting words doctrine allowed speech restrictions in situation where a
person called a city official a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist” because his words
would have “likely provoked the average person to retaliate, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace”).
343. Corry, No. 740309, at 3.
344. Id. at 4, 28.
345. Id. at 4.
346. Id. at 42–43.
347. Id. at 6–7. For this point, the court relied on R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which invalidated
a state anti-hate crime ordinance punishing certain categories of fighting words—based on race,
color, creed, religion, or gender—but not others. Id. at 10–12 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
348. Corry, No. 740309, at 9.
349. Id. at 20.
350. Id. at 27.
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Defendants incorrectly suggest that “academic freedom” provides them with
carte blanche to do what they wish. Both Regents of University of California v.
Bakke and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, cases relied upon by the Defendants,
discuss academic freedom in the context of academic decisions. The Speech
Code, however, has nothing to do with any of the four academic freedoms the
351
Supreme Court has established.

Thus, the court found the Leonard Law constitutional and not a violation of
academic freedom.
On March 9, 1995, Stanford President Gerhard Casper issued a response to
the decision.352 Casper disagreed with the court’s opinion.353 He maintained
that the university speech rule was not overbroad and the Leonard Law was
unconstitutional.354 He first argued that the speech restriction relied on the
fighting words exception to the First Amendment and should have been
upheld.355 As to the second issue, Casper asserted that he disagreed with the
court that the speech regulation had nothing to do with academic freedom as
set forth in Sweezy.356 He contended that almost all other states respect their
universities’ discretion to set their own educational policies—policies like the
regulation of hate speech.357 However, he stated that in order to preserve
Stanford’s limited resources, the university would not appeal the decision.358
The dispute in Corry provides an example of how a state legislature can
collapse the distinction between private and public actors through the
enactment of laws. In this case, First Amendment principles are applied at a
private university through a legislative rule. State action analysis was,
therefore, not necessary. California lawmakers decided that maintaining free
speech at both public and private universities was more important than just
fettering the power of the state to control people’s expression. California,
however, is the only state with such a law.
In sum, Article 78 in New York and the Leonard Law in California provide
two examples of legal mechanisms that collapse the public/private distinction.
These laws, however, are state-specific so they do not offer broad protection to

351. Id. at 36 (citations omitted). In Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence acknowledged
a university’s freedom “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
352. Gerhard Casper, Statement on Corry vs. Stanford University President Gerhard Casper,
Stanford University Faculty Senate, STANFORD U. NEWS SERV. (Mar. 9, 1995), http://news.stan
ford.edu/pr/95/950309Arc5331.html.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Casper, supra note 352.
358. Id.
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professors outside their respective states. In other words, they are unable to
adequately fill the broad gaps left by constitutionally based academic freedom.
I will detail these gaps in the next section before suggesting a more
comprehensive alternative to the First Amendment.
3.

The Inadequacy of First Amendment-Based Academic Freedom Law
and the Need for an Alternative Legal Foundation

The state action doctrine, as required in First Amendment analysis,
prioritizes the limitation of unfettered state power. As part of this doctrine, the
theoretical focus is on how much governmental involvement is ideal in
university decisions. On the one end of the spectrum is complete government
control over university decisions. This would not be the best way to protect
academic freedom. The McCarthy era, while not a complete government takeover of universities, came close. During this time, inquiry into unpopular
subjects and theories was severely chilled and academic freedom suffered. On
the other end lies complete institutional autonomy for university decisions.
This, too, would be less than ideal. For decades, federal, state, and local laws
have shielded professors at both public and private universities from
discriminatory treatment by the universities based on race, gender, sexual
orientation and other protected categories. Other laws have ensured fair
employment practices and safe workplaces and numerous other employee
benefits. And others have imposed ethical duties on research involving human
subjects. In a world with complete institutional autonomy, such reasonable
external interference into the internal decision-making of the university would
be prohibited. This unlimited discretion would lead to unjust outcomes that
externally imposed laws were implemented to prevent. Courts have struggled
to find the ideal middle ground between these two extremes. The balancing of
the proper amount of government involvement in university affairs makes
sense for cases in which the state is interfering with educational decisionmaking at both public and private universities. This has been the typical case.
In such disputes, institutional and professorial interests are aligned. For
example, in Bakke and subsequent cases allowing public universities to
consider race in the selection of their students, the interests of the universities
in the educational benefits of diversity were not in conflict with professorial
interests.359 The Court, therefore, made no distinction between professorial and
institutional academic freedom when it discussed this freedom in the opinions.
When the interests between institutions and professors diverge, however,
the state action limitation precludes judicial resolution of academic freedom
issues at private institutions. J. Peter Byrne observes, “[T]he state action
doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of constitutional liberties against

359. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
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institutional infringements for half the nation’s academics and denies it to the
other half for reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far removed from the
realities of academic life.”360 These reasons focus on restricting state power.
But when professors are involved in disputes with universities, regardless of
the level of state involvement, the most relevant inquiry should be how we can
best protect the principles of academic freedom for the benefit of society.
However, the state action doctrine will preclude any analysis at most private
universities. For example, in a case where a private university (i.e., a private
university not deemed a state actor) is attempting to unduly restrict the
scholarly work of a professor, no constitutional remedy would be available. In
other words, the state action doctrine would preclude a constitutional analysis
even when a state university professor would be protected in the same
situation. The application of state action, thus, creates illogical results because
vastly different legal outcomes would arise depending on whether the
university is public or private even though the purposes of higher education at
both types of institutions would be the same.
In addition, for universities that are restricted by the First Amendment (i.e.,
state actors), the principles arising from public employee free speech cases
have been inadequate to protect the academic freedom of professors at state
universities. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky noted that there are no
constitutionally based academic freedom rights for professors—these rights, if
they exist at all, belong solely to the institution.361 This holding, if followed by
other courts, has dire implications as to the scant level of protection that
professors will be afforded under a constitutional theory of academic freedom.
Furthermore, regarding non-classroom-related speech, cases post Garcetti have
struggled with how to apply the Garcetti reservation to state university
professors. While courts have afforded professors some protection when they
are teaching their students, their expression in other contexts has not fared as
well.362 Indeed, most of the rulings have simply ignored the reservation,
meaning that professors, even at state universities, are without constitutional
protection because almost all of their disputed speech has been held to have
been pursuant to their official duties. Both Urofsky and Garcetti, as applied to
university professors have therefore, created a situation in which constitutional
academic freedom for professors is on extremely shaky footing.
A new legal foundation for professorial academic freedom is sorely
needed. In order to expand the academic freedom protections for all university

360. Byrne, supra note 224, at 299–300 (footnotes omitted).
361. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000).
362. Compare Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that professor speech related to teaching was protected), with Renken v. Gregory, 541
F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that professor speech criticizing university management
was not protected).
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professors, regardless of the state involvement at their institutions, the proper
theoretical focus should be on how we can ensure that universities act in a way
that maximizes the social benefits of higher education. The policy statements
of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)—“the single
most influential and important defender of professional tenure and academic
freedom” —embody this focus.363 For example, one of the AAUP’s most
influential policy statements, the 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic
Freedom and Tenure, acknowledged, “Institutions of higher education are
conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the
individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends
upon the free search for truth and its free expression.”364 The AAUP made no
distinction between public and private universities. Both were “conducted for
the common good.”365 As such, the AAUP’s normative statements regarding
academic freedom at American universities contain no state action
requirement. They apply to all American universities whose mission is the
unfettered search for truth.
For the same reasons that the unique statutory twists based on state law pay
no heed to state actor requirements—e.g., review of private universities in
Article 78 proceedings and the application of the Leonard Law to private
institutions—I contend that protecting academic freedom at both public and
private American universities is more important “for the common good” than
restricting only state action. Thus, I urge an alternative mechanism that would
protect professorial rights on a wider scale. I turn away from constitutional law
and explore other sources of law that will allow this to happen. In my
exploration, I not only aim to expand academic freedom protections for
professors at both public and private institutions, but also to find a legal
foundation that will permit the recognition of AAUP policies as guideposts in
adjudicating professorial academic freedom rights.
In a context related to professorial rights, some courts have attempted to
protect student rights at private universities by common law principles when
constitutional protection was unavailable due to the state actor doctrine. The
author of a Yale Law Journal article contends:
The common law protects valuable interests of individuals and groups from
arbitrary deprivation or unreasonable injury if those interests have enterpriseworth or are deemed inherently worthwhile under the prevailing social ethic.

363. LUCAS, supra note 7, at 206.
364. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Statement of Principles,
1940, 27 BULL. AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS 40, 40–41 (1941) (footnote omitted).
365. Id.
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Students at private universities have an interest sufficiently valuable under
366
these tests that the courts should protect it against arbitrary deprivation.

As applied to the academic freedom rights of a private university professor,
this property-based associational right is a clumsy solution, at best. I can
envision a claim for these rights arising when a professor at a private university
has been discharged in violation of academic freedom principles. A reliance on
private associational rights to protect this professor, however, does not take
into consideration the unique context of higher education and the special
purpose of this enterprise. The same analysis would apply to any private
entity—from boating club to social club to private university. This broad
framework would, thus, be insufficient in dealing with professorial rights
because it would fail to take into account the ideals of academic freedom and
the social utility of higher education. Furthermore, this analysis of private
associational rights would create a body of law that excludes analysis at public
institutions. Academic freedom predicated on these common law rights would,
therefore, create separate rules for private versus public entities—much like the
state action doctrine has done.
In order to take into account the unique context of American higher
education, I propose an alternative foundation of academic freedom grounded
in contract law. Contract law allows the recognition of AAUP’s principles as
interpretive guideposts in adjudicating disputes between professors and their
universities. This organization’s rich history in protecting academic freedom
has significant bearing on the reasonable expectations of modern-day
professors and universities regarding academic freedom rights. Further, unlike
First Amendment analysis, contract law makes no distinction between state and
private actors. The agreement controls the rights and duties of the parties, both
public and private. Also, unlike First Amendment analysis, contract law allows
for the recognition of professors as something more than just public
employees. Specifically, it permits inquiry into rights and duties based on the
reasonable understandings of the parties and, in some situations, guided by the
norms and customs of the scholarly profession as a whole, as to what academic
freedom entails rather than predicating the analysis on public employee status.
Finally, contract law may provide better-tailored remedies than constitutional
law could in academic disputes. Contract law attempts to make parties whole
in the event of a breach of an agreement. In other words, it looks to the
expectations of the parties to see where the aggrieved party would be if the
breaching party performed under the agreement and tries to make up the
difference by awarding monetary damages or other remedies. Remedies under
contract law are typically context-specific and narrow. They arise from the

366. Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action
Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 150 (1974).
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mutual assent of the parties in a myriad of higher educational contexts.
Contract law is flexible enough to encompass such contextual differences
because it leaves room for the understanding of the parties to change
depending on the different types of institutions involved. Constitutional law,
on the other hand, attempts to fashion remedies that conform to constitutional
principles. It looks to judicial interpretations of these principles and tries to
make rules that apply to any particular dispute based on these interpretations.
Constitutional remedies, therefore, tend to be broad and far-reaching. They
arise from general principles and apply to specific situations across the
country. Based on the wide range of disputes that can arise under the umbrella
of professorial academic freedom, contract remedies provide the necessary
specificity to consider each unique campus context and allow for the crafting
of tailored remedies that take into account the reasonable expectations of the
parties. Constitutional law’s broader remedies, on the other hand, do not allow
sufficient flexibility to tailor remedies to different contexts.
Although constitutional protections would remain available to professors at
state universities, I have argued in this part that they are insufficient.
Therefore, I urge that plaintiffs and judges rely on an alternative contractual
basis for academic freedom that provides more comprehensive protection for
professors across the country.
Some lower courts have recognized a contractual basis for academic
freedom rights. I will outline this alternative foundation in the final part.
PART III: A CONTRACT THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A.

An Alternative Foundation for Professorial Academic Freedom: Contract
Law
1.

Express Contractual Terms

A contract is “[a]n agreement between two or more parties creating
obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”367 The
formation of a contract requires “a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.”368 In contract disputes,
courts will try to determine what the parties intended when entering into the
agreement.

367. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (10th ed. 2014).
368. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (2005). Mutual assent means an
“[a]greement by both parties to a contact, [usually] in the form of offer and acceptance.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 189 (10th ed. 2014). And consideration refers to “[s]omething (such
as an act, a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from a
promisee.” Id. at 378.
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Contractual duties can arise from the express terms of an agreement. An
express contract is an agreement “whose terms the parties have explicitly set
out.”369 For example, some universities detail the rights and obligations of their
professors as part of their faculty handbooks. A number of courts have given
the provisions of such handbooks contractual status. In Sola v. Lafayette
College, a college professor, alleging gender discrimination, brought a breach
of contract action against her college after she was denied tenure.370 The Third
Circuit held that language in the faculty handbook regarding affirmative action
could have contractual status and provided the faculty member with a cause of
action based on breach of this provision.371 Similarly, in Arneson v. Board of
Trustees, McKendree College, a college professor at McKendree College who
was terminated from employment brought a breach of contract action arguing
that he did not receive the proper notice as required by the faculty handbook.372
The Appellate Court of Illinois held that the handbook was legally binding
because the college caused its faculty to rely on the manual as part of the “rules
and regulations of the College” to which both parties were subject.373
Duties may also arise from express terms contained in faculty handbooks
but read in the unique context of higher education. In Greene v. Howard
University, five non-tenured faculty members were terminated without notice
or hearing for their involvement in campus disturbances.374 The professors
asserted “that the University failed in its obligation, incident to their contracts,
to give the appropriate advance notice of non-renewal.”375 The D.C. Circuit
noted that even though the faculty handbook was not incorporated by reference
into the employment agreement, it nonetheless “governs the relationship
between faculty members and the University.”376 When the university pointed
to a disclaimer in the faculty handbook that denied any contractual obligations
created by the words contained in the handbook, the court refused to honor this
disclaimer, observing:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct
and expectations founded upon them. This is especially true of contracts in and
among a community of scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of
377
the market place are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context.

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (10th ed. 2014).
Sola v. Lafayette Coll., 804 F.2d 40, 41–42 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 45.
Arneson v. Bd. of Trs., McKendree Coll., 569 N.E.2d 252, 253–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 254, 256–57.
Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id. at 1135.
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The court found in favor of the professors noting that, despite the disclaimer,
the provisions in the faculty handbook gave the professors the right to
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.378 As Greene suggests, some
courts will emphasize that the interpretation of contractual obligations will rest
on the particular context of higher education, which is unlike the commercial
realm, even to the point of invalidating explicit disclaimers contained in
faculty handbooks.379
Alternative sources of express contractual duties may include letters of
appointment combined with institutional rules. In Brady v. Board of Trustees
of the Nebraska State Colleges, a tenured professor of history at Wayne State
College was terminated without a hearing after the college’s budget was
reduced.380 The professor challenged his summary dismissal based on a breach
of contract theory.381 His employment contract “specifically included the
college bylaws, policies, and practices relating to academic tenure, and faculty
dismissal procedures.”382 The court, in ruling that the denial of due process
breached provisions of the college bylaws, observed:
There can be no serious question but that the bylaws of the governing body
with respect to termination and conditions of employment became a part of the
employment contract between the college and Brady. At the time of the offer
and acceptance of initial appointment . . . , Brady was advised in writing that
the offer and acceptance of appointment at Wayne constituted a contract
honoring the policies and practices set forth in the faculty handbook, which
383
was furnished to him at that time.

AAUP policy documents, when incorporated by reference in employment
agreements, can also form the basis of contractual obligations between
professors and their universities. Specifically, these documents can elucidate
the norms and shared understandings between the parties. Indeed, some courts
have relied on AAUP policy statements to determine if a breach of contract
occurred in certain situations. For example, in Browzin v. Catholic University
of America, a tenured professor of engineering was terminated due to
conditions of “financial exigency” and, in determining if a breach of contract
occurred, the court faced the issue of whether the professor’s termination was

378. Id. at 1131, 1134–35.
379. Note that not all employment contexts will elicit such an outcome. See, e.g., Natalie
Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts Interpret Employee
Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 101–61 (2008) (providing a general
discussion on the different approaches that courts have used to interpret employee handbook
disclaimers).
380. Brady v. Bd. of Trs. of Neb. State Colls., 242 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Neb. 1976).
381. Id. at 617, 619.
382. Id. at 618.
383. Id. at 619.
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consistent with the AAUP’s definition of this concept.384 The parties stipulated
that the 1968 AAUP regulations were incorporated by the contract between the
professor and university.385 In ruling for the university, the court relied on a
number of AAUP materials outside the 1968 regulations to interpret the
agreement, stating:
Those materials include statements widely circulated and widely accepted by a
large number of organizations involved in higher education (such as the 1925
Conference Statement and the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure), as well as guidelines and reports issued by the AAUP as
a result of its investigations into incidents where principles of academic
freedom or tenure have allegedly been violated. . . . As to the former
documents—the widely accepted statements—the propriety of our considering
them in interpreting the contract here could hardly be questioned. They form a
kind of legislative history for the 1968 Regulations, and they do represent
widely shared norms within the academic community, having achieved
acceptance by organizations which represent teachers as well as organizations
386
which represent college administrators and governing boards.

Collective bargaining agreements can also provide express terms that
merge professional norms with contractual duties. This has not always been so.
In 1919, the president of the AAUP, Arthur Lovejoy, declared “three decisive
reasons” why the AAUP should not be part of a labor union.387 First, he noted
that the majority of university professors would not be part of a faculty union
in the near future so pursuing this organizational form would be divisive to the
profession.388 Second, Lovejoy observed that labor unions’ primary objectives
are to increase wages, diminish the hours of labor, and improve working
conditions for wage earners.389 However, university professors are different
from other wage earners because they “are responsible officers of institutions
created by the state or by the voluntary gifts of other men for public ends—for
the maintenance of one of the highest and most important functions in the life
of society.”390 As such, labor unions are not capable of representing the
384. Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 844–45 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
385. Id. at 845.
386. Id. at 847 n.8. However, the D.C. Circuit noted that “[t]he propriety of considering the
latter category—the AAUP’s guidelines and reports—however, is more problematic. Although
the AAUP’s investigations are noted for their thoroughness and scrupulous care, the reports
remain the product of an organization composed of professors alone.” Id. The court noted that due
to the professor’s failure to establish a prima facie case of contract breach based on the AAUP
statement alone, it would not have to “delve more deeply into the applicability of the AAUP
guidelines and reports.” Id.
387. Arthur O. Lovejoy, Annual Message of the President, 5 BULL. AM. ASS’N U.
PROFESSORS 10, 23 (1919).
388. Id. at 23, 25.
389. Id. at 25.
390. Id.
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interests of university professors, which include enabling “the profession . . . to
discharge their distinctive function in the economy of modern society with the
highest degree of competency and serviceableness.”391 Third, he argued that a
university professor is “a professional investigator of social problems” and
“ought to avoid entangling permanent alliances with any of the purely
economic groups which are now struggling with one another to retain or to
increase their shares of the social dividend.”392
By the 1970s, the AAUP’s conception of itself in relation to collective
bargaining would change. While in its early years, the AAUP insisted it was
unlike a union and more like a professional association akin to the American
Bar and American Medical Associations, by 1970, General Secretary Bertram
A. Davis signaled a break from this idea:
It is a mistake to conclude, as many do, that the American Association of
University Professors should model its policies after those of the American Bar
Association or the American Medical Association. However estimable those
associations may be, their policies have been adapted to the fact that members
of the legal and medical professions are largely self-employed and deal
directly with the public. Members of the academic profession of course are not
self-employed, and it is their institutions rather than they which deal directly
393
with the public.

Philo A. Hutcheson notes that, in the following years, AAUP leadership
pursued “a cautious yet oddly determined development of collective
bargaining.”394
By 1973, the AAUP issued a “Statement on Collective Bargaining” that
provided, “The longstanding programs of the Association are means to achieve
a number of basic ends at colleges and universities: the enhancement of
academic freedom and tenure; of due process; of sound academic government.
Collective bargaining, properly used, is essentially another means to achieve
these ends.”395 The AAUP was, therefore, endorsing collective bargaining
agreements as mechanisms that could fuse professional norms with express

391. Id. at 26.
392. Lovejoy, supra note 387, at 26.
393. Bertram H. Davis, From the General Secretary: A Responsible Profession, 56 BULL.
AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 357, 357 (1970).
394. PHILO A. HUTCHESON, A PROFESSIONAL PROFESSORIATE: UNIONIZATION,
BUREAUCRATIZATION, AND THE AAUP 135 (2000).
395. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Statement on Collective Bargaining, 59 BULL. AM.
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 167, 167 (1973). This Statement was “revised in 1984, was approved by
the Association’s Committee on Representation of Economic and Professional Interests, adopted
by the Association’s Council in November 1993, and endorsed by the Eightieth Annual Meeting.
In 2009, the AAUP Council approved a minor revision of the statement.” Statement on Collective
Bargaining, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org/re port/statement-collectivebargaining (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
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contractual obligations. Modern examples include agreements in which the
AAUP is designated as the official bargaining representative.396 In these
agreements, AAUP policies are typically included as contract provisions. Kent
State’s collective bargaining agreement is a particularly detailed example of
academic freedom that arises from contract. Article IV, titled “Academic
Freedom and Professional Responsibility,” provides:
Section 1. The parties recognize that membership in the academic profession
carries with it both special rights and also special responsibilities. Accordingly,
the parties reaffirm their mutual commitment to the concepts of academic
freedom and professional responsibility.
Section 2. As stated in the American Association of University Professors’
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Faculty
members are entitled to freedom in research and in the publication of the
results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties. The
principles of academic freedom and freedom of inquiry shall be interpreted to
include freedom of expression in both traditional print and newly-emerging
electronic formats such as the creation of digital images, web sites, or home
pages.
Faculty members are entitled to freedom in the classroom (including the virtual
classroom) in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their
subject. In making public statements—including the exercise of the right to
responsible dissent on matters of institutional policy or educational
philosophy—members of the Faculty have an obligation to be accurate, to
exercise appropriate restraint, to show respect for the opinions of others and to
make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the University.
Section 3. As stated in the American Association of University Professors’
1966 Statement on Professional Ethics, Faculty members, in exercising their
professional roles as teacher, scholar and colleague, accept the obligation to
exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending and
transmitting knowledge, and to practice intellectual honesty in accord with the
standards of expectation of their respective disciplines and of the University’s
397
Faculty Code of Professional Ethics.

Further, consistent with AAUP policies, the Kent State agreement also
includes provisions for faculty participation in policy and details on the tenure

396. The AAUP website notes, “Currently, over seventy local AAUP chapters have been
recognized as collective bargaining agents representing faculty, graduate employees, academic
professionals, and contingent faculty from all sectors of higher education.” Collective Bargaining,
AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org/issues/collective-bargaining (last visited
Jan. 27, 2015).
397. TENURE-TRACK UNIT OF THE AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, KENT STATE UNIV.,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. IV (2005), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.
cornell.edu/blscontracts/1654.
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process.398 Collective bargaining agreements that employ such language, thus,
create academic freedom obligations for both professors and their universities.
These contracts, therefore, can provide an additional and especially robust
source of academic freedom rights and duties.
In recent years, most academic unionization has occurred at state
universities rather than their private counterparts. The expansion of faculty
collective bargaining into private universities essentially ceased after NLRB v.
Yeshiva University,399 where the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1980 that
Yeshiva professors were “managerial employees,” and thus excluded from
coverage under the National Labor Relations Act—a federal law that
guaranteed collective bargaining rights to private-sector employees, but not to
managers. After Yeshiva, most private universities could elect to, but were no
longer required to, recognize faculty unions as official bargaining
representatives. Despite this decision, a number of AAUP chapters at private
universities continue to maintain the benefits and protections of collective
bargaining.400 Public university professors, not affected by Yeshiva, continue to
engage in collective bargaining pursuant to state laws.
2.

Implicit Contractual Terms

When a written agreement does not exist or does not capture the full intent
of the parties, contractual obligations can be implicit. There are two types of
implicit contracts: implied-in-fact and implied-in-law. Implied-in-fact contracts
are agreements “that the parties presumably intended as their tacit
understanding, as inferred from their conduct and other circumstances.”401 An
implied-in-law contract is a duty “created by law for the sake of justice,
[specifically], an obligation imposed by law because of some special
relationship between them or because one of them would otherwise be unjustly
enriched.”402 As evidenced by case law, the most relevant type for my analysis
is the implied-in-fact agreement.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann, a case involving a
professor’s challenge to his termination based on his public criticism of the
Board of Regents, explained the difference between express and implied-infact terms as it related to the dispute at hand:

398. Id.
399. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 694 (1980).
400. Collective Bargaining, supra note 396. Note that NLRB action in May 2012 regarding
faculty bargaining at Point Park University has suggested that the Board may be trying to re-open
the issues decided in Yeshiva. See Scott Jaschik, Reopening ‘Yeshiva’?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May
24, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/05/24/nlrb-action-suggests-possibilityreopening-yeshiva-case-faculty-unions.
401. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (10th ed. 2014).
402. Id.
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[T]he law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a
process by which agreements, though not formalized in writing, may be
“implied.” Explicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other
agreements implied from “the promisor’s words and conduct in light of the
surrounding circumstances.” And, “[t]he meaning of [the promisor’s] words
and acts is found by relating them to the usage of the past. . . .”
. . . . [S]o there may be an unwritten “common law” in a particular university
that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. This is particularly
likely in a college or university, like Odessa Junior College, that has no
explicit tenure system even for senior members of its faculty, but that
403
nonetheless may have created such a system in practice.

The Court, therefore, recognized the possible existence of implied-in-fact
“common law” practices in a particular university based on the academic
custom and usage of that university.404 In another case employing custom and
usage analysis, Bason v. American University, an assistant professor of law
was denied tenure, and he challenged this decision as a breach of contract.405
He claimed that the university failed to give him feedback on his tenure
progress.406 In reversing summary judgment for the university, the D.C. Court
of Appeals noted:
As we interpret the record, the fundamental issue is whether [the professor]
had a contractual right to be evaluated and kept informed of his progress
toward tenure. The answer to that question requires resort to the actual
employment contract, those documents expressly incorporated into it (the
Faculty Manual, the Bylaws of the American Association of Law Schools, and
the “Standards and Rules of Procedures,” Approval of Law Schools, American
407
Bar Association) and the customs and practices of the University.

Not all cases that utilize the customs and practices of an institution as a
contractual interpretation device hold for the faculty member. In Brown v.
George Washington University,408 an education professor challenged her denial
of promotion and tenure as a breach of contract. She claimed that her
department had not followed its own written policy that provided that
candidates for promotion would be invited to appear before the promotion
committee to present additional relevant information. Faculty members in the
education department testified that they had a practice of interpreting this
provision as discretionary.409 In deciding for the university, the court ruled that

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 601–02 (citations omitted).
See id. at 601.
Bason v. American Univ., 414 A.2d 522, 523 (D.C. 1980).
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Brown v. George Washington Univ., 802 A.2d. 382, 384, 386 (D.C. 2002).
Id. at 386.
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the department’s interpretation was reasonable and not a breach of contract.410
The custom and usage of this particular department, therefore, determined the
outcome of the case.
Other courts have recognized custom and usage of the academic
community—not just at a specific university or department but the scholarly
community as a whole—to analyze the terms of a professor’s contract. William
A. Kaplin and Barbara A. Lee observe in this regard:
As a method of contractual interpretation, a court may look beyond the policies
of the institution to the manner in which faculty employment terms are shaped
in higher education generally. In these cases the court may use “academic
custom and usage” to determine what the parties would have agreed to had
they addressed a particular issue. This interpretive device is only used,
however, when the contract is ambiguous, or when a court believes that a
411
significant element of the contract is missing.

For example, in McConnell v. Howard University, a professor was fired
because he refused to teach a math class until a disciplinary dispute with a
student was resolved.412 He challenged his termination on breach of contract
grounds.413 In remanding the case for trial, the court noted that when the
contract terms are ambiguous, they “must be construed in keeping with general
usage and custom at the University and within the academic community.”414
Also, in Board of Regents of Kentucky State University v. Gale, a professor
was appointed to the institution’s first endowed chair in the humanities.415 The
university subsequently sought to make the professor execute a contract that
would impose a time limitation on his endowed chair.416 The professor
challenged the university’s actions in court arguing that his appointment
implicitly came with permanent status (i.e., tenure).417 The court, in ruling for
the professor, noted, “The evidence relied upon by the trial court in the instant
case showed that, unless the advertisement for the position otherwise indicated,
it was customary and understood within the academic community that the chair
was to be occupied by a distinguished colleague for his life time.”418 The
academic custom and usage of the professoriate was, thus, determinative in
analyzing this implied term.
Although this remains an issue yet to be decided by the courts, when
academic freedom is not addressed in a professor’s employment contract, I
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 387.
KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 251, at 479–80.
McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
Bd. of Regents of Ky. State Univ. v. Gale, 898 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521.
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argue that the custom and usage of the academic community regarding these
rights can be elucidated by AAUP policies and principles. Matthew W. Finkin
and Robert C. Post contend:
As the reasoned conclusions of an especially knowledgeable body, the
opinions of Committee A [AAUP’s investigative committee] offer an
unusually rich resource for understanding the meaning of academic freedom in
America. They strive to interpret a governing instrument, the 1940 Statement,
which has achieved near-universal acceptance in the academic community.
They do so in a disciplined, lawlike way, seeking to apply principle to context,
often by reasoning from precedential analogies. . . . They are backed by a
system of sanctions that, although lacking the coercive power of the state, are
nevertheless consequential. The opinions thus conduce toward a coherent
419
national system of norms.

This coherent set of norms can aid courts in interpreting the reasonable
expectations of professors and universities when they enter into contractual
relationships. Specifically, I can envision a dispute in which a professor claims
that her university violated her contractually based academic freedom rights
and the university responds that these rights do not exist because they are not
explicitly provided for in the employment agreement. Along with other sources
of implicit terms, if any, a court can benefit by turning to AAUP opinions and
policies as general academic custom and usage to determine the reasonable
expectation of the parties regarding academic freedom in this situation.
3.

The Limitations of Contract Law and Suggested Solutions

Due to the limitations of constitutionally based academic freedom, contract
law is better at protecting individual faculty members when their interests
diverge from their institutions. However, contract law is by no means perfect.
In this section, I highlight three limitations of a contracts-based approach to
academic freedom and offer potential solutions.
First, contracts are governed by state law, so the law of one state may
conflict with the laws in others.420 For example, even though I highlighted
some key legal decisions that rely on an expansive view of what constitutes a
professor’s employment contract, some courts are reluctant to take this
interpretive path. I have already discussed three New York cases that have
rejected professors’ contract-based claims against their universities, holding
that the proper legal mechanism for challenging their employment grievances

419. MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 51–52 (2009).
420. See, e.g., AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, FACULTY HANDBOOKS AS ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACTS: A STATE GUIDE IV (2009), available at http://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/
files/Faculty%20Handbooks%20as%20Contracts%20Complete.pdf (summarizing conflicting
state laws regarding faculty handbooks as contracts).
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was Article 78.421 Other courts have also rejected contract claims brought by
professors. In Marson v. Northwestern State University, an associate professor
challenged his termination as in violation of the university’s faculty
handbook.422 The state appellate court held that the faculty handbook was not
binding because it was not explicitly made part of the employment
agreement.423 Similarly, in University of Baltimore v. Iz, the appellate court
found that general statements of policy contained in the faculty handbook did
not create enforceable contract rights.424 In a case dealing with academic
custom and usage, Jones v. University of Central Oklahoma, a professor of
education challenged his denial of tenure, arguing that it violated the custom
and usage of the university regarding prior tenure decisions.425 In holding for
the university, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that custom and usage will
not supersede a contrary written tenure policy, even if past practice by the
university differs from the written terms.426 Also, contrary to some of the cases
I analyzed that demonstrated a broad view of using AAUP policy statements to
resolve a number of educational disputes, some courts have ruled that an
adoption of a particular statement will not contractually bind the university to
subsequently issued statements. For example, in Waring v. Fordham
University, a faculty member at the Graduate School of Social Service who
was denied tenure sued for breach of contract.427 Fordham University had a
policy that placed a limit on the proportion of tenured faculty at each of its
schools.428 Fordham, however, had adopted the 1940 Statement that did not
issue an opinion on tenure quotas—not the subsequent 1973 Statement
opposing such quotas.429 The court, noting that the university did not adopt the
1973 Statement, ruled that the university’s action was not a breach of
contract.430 Because of the vagaries of differing state laws, Cary Nelson urges
that “shared governance, due process, and tenure regulations need to be

421. See Maas v. Cornell Univ., 721 N.E.2d 966, 970 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that Maas failed
to plead a distinct breach of contract claim); Padiyar v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva
Univ., 900 N.Y.S.2d 866, 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim is timebarred by a four-month statute of limitations); Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567, 569
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (noting that the professor cannot establish a clear contractual right to the
amenities of tenure claimed).
422. Marson v. Northwestern State Univ., 607 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
423. Id. at 1096.
424. Univ. of Balt. v. Iz, 716 A.2d 1107, 1126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
425. Jones v. Univ. of Cent. Okla., 910 P.2d 987, 988 (Okla. 1995).
426. Id. at 991.
427. Waring v. Fordham Univ., 640 F. Supp. 42, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 44.
430. Id. at 43; See also Jacobs v. Mundelein Coll., Inc., 628 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (holding only expressly incorporated AAUP policies are binding).
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mirrored in legally enforceable contracts.”431 Clarity in express contractual
language is essential. Clear contract language that creates such terms will, thus,
provide professors and universities with much more predictability in how a
court will enforce the rights of the parties. Jim Jackson advocates an even
stronger approach to contract drafting by arguing that the language should “not
only describe academic freedom as contractual but[,] in an interpretive sense[,]
say that it is a fundamental clause.”432 This would benefit both professors and
universities by ensuring that the unique context of American higher education
is taken into account when enforcing the contractual rights and duties of the
parties.
Second, the greater bargaining power that universities have over professors
may skew the agreement terms away from academic freedom. Some scholars
have suggested that universities may even try to tweak contract language to
weaken such protection and offer jobs to professors on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.433 Others have warned of the dangers when employers unilaterally
change their policies.434 In these situations, professors can claim protection
under the doctrine of unconscionability. This doctrine reflects the idea “that a
court may refuse to enforce a contract that is unfair or oppressive because of
procedural abuses during contract formation or because of overreaching
contractual terms, esp. terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party while
precluding meaningful choice for the other party.”435 However, the heavy
burden in proving unconscionability would lie with the professor. Another
possible solution would be for professors to rely on the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in contract law. This is an “implied covenant to
refrain from any act that would injure a contracting party’s right to receive the

431. CARY NELSON, NO UNIVERSITY IS AN ISLAND: SAVING ACADEMIC FREEDOM 195
(2010).
432. Jim Jackson, Express and Implied Contractual Rights to Academic Freedom in the
United States, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 467, 495 (1999).
433. See Neil H. Hutchens, A Confused Concern of the First Amendment: The Uncertain
Status of Constitutional Protection for Individual Academic Freedom, 36 J.C. & U.L. 145, 181
(2009) (stating that institutions can draw less attention to tweaking individual contracts than by
making a change to an institution-wide policy).
434. See Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further
Encroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 199–200 (1990)
(stating that employees cannot presume a satisfactory duration of employment); Michael D.
Strong, Personnel Policy Manuals as Legally Enforceable Contracts: The Implied-in-Fact
Contract—A Limitation on the Employer’s Right to Terminate at Will, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 368,
414 (1990) (indicating employment-at-will doctrines have been subject to increasing criticisms in
the modern workforce); Brian T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers
from Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799,
805 (2003) (advocating that employers should not be able to modify contractual relations without
additional consideration and employee assent).
435. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1757 (10th ed. 2014).
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benefit of the contract.”436 This covenant is premised on the idea that certain
promises are “instinct with an obligation” to act in good faith.437 An aggrieved
faculty member that had academic freedom rights written out of her contract
could claim that the university breached its duty to act in good faith. These
protective doctrines, however, are open to the criticism that they create
uncertainty in outcomes due to the subjective judicial evaluations they require.
Therefore, the better solution would entail professors negotiating for clear
terms in their contracts. In order to improve their bargaining positions, I argue
that professors should enter into or strengthen their relationships with
educational organizations that can create pressure for universities to operate in
good faith in making academic freedom part of their employment agreements.
The AAUP is one of their strongest allies in this regard. For example, this
organization recently advocated for model policy language regarding academic
freedom rights being adopted by universities across the country. In a report in
2009, the AAUP pointed to the following clause from the University of
Minnesota’s academic freedom policy as particularly effective language for
incorporation in faculty handbooks and agreements:
Academic freedom is the freedom to discuss all relevant matters in the
classroom, to explore all avenues of scholarship, research, and creative
expression, and to speak or write without institutional discipline or restraint on
matters of public concern as well as on matters related to professional duties
and the functioning of the University. Academic responsibility implies the
faithful performance of professional duties and obligations, the recognition of
the demands of the scholarly enterprise, and the candor to make it clear when
one is speaking on matters of public interest, one is not speaking for the
438
institution.

Incorporation of such policy language into professors’ contracts can
provide a shared contractual basis of academic freedom rights across the
country. In addition, the AAUP has been working to create pressure on
universities through the accreditation process. In a 2012 statement, the AAUP,
in conjunction with the Council for Higher Education Accreditation, argued
that accreditation agencies take academic freedom into account when making
their decisions.439 The statement offered the following suggestions for
accrediting agencies:

436. Id. at 443.
437. Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). Wood is the classic case of a court
interpreting an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a contract.
438. ROBERT M. O’NEIL ET AL., PROTECTING AN INDEPENDENT FACULTY VOICE: ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AFTER GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS 87–88 (2009), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/
Protecting-Independent-Voice.pdf.
439. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION,
ACCREDITATION AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
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 Emphasize the principle of academic freedom in the context of accreditation
review, stressing its fundamental meaning and essential value.
 Affirm the role that accreditation plays in the protection and advancement
of academic freedom.
 Review current accreditation standards, policies and procedures with regard
to academic freedom and assure that institutions and programs accord with
high expectations in this vital area.
 At accreditation meetings and workshops, focus on challenges to academic
freedom, with particular attention to the current climate and its effect on
faculty, institutions and programs.
 Explore developing partnerships among accreditors to concentrate
additional attention on academic freedom and further secure the
440
commitment of the entire accreditation community.

By making academic freedom a consideration for accreditation, professors’
bargaining position with regard to this term would be greatly enhanced.
Specifically, universities would be more likely to adopt contractual obligations
regarding academic freedom if accreditation agencies were evaluating them
based on their commitment to this freedom.
Third, academic freedom, as defined by contract law, may support the
erroneous view that higher education can be reduced to a commodity—i.e.,
universities are simply pushing a commercial product on students, who are just
consumers of this product. A number of scholars have critiqued this view.441
Nonetheless, the commodity view of higher education continues to percolate
through society. It was evidenced by a judge in a case involving a student who
challenged the university’s disciplinary action for his sexual misconduct. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held for Brandeis, but a dissenting
judge in the case disagreed with the majority, observing, “As consumers,
students should not be subject to disciplinary procedures that fail to comport

PROFESSORS—COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION ADVISORY STATEMENT
(2012), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/AAUP-CHEA%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
440. Id.
441. See DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 2–5 (2003) (explaining that universities have lost their intellectual moorings
creating aimlessness through commercialization); WESLEY SHUMAR, COLLEGE FOR SALE: A
CRITIQUE OF THE COMMODIFICATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 12 (1997) (arguing the
increasingly untenable commodification of universities by corporations creates crises on
campuses); SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARRY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (2004) (noting that academic
capitalism considers students as consumers and academic institutions as marketers). JENNIFER
WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 139 (2005) (indicating that academic-industry relationships have flourished creating
universities that cater to corporate needs).
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with the rules promulgated by the school itself.”442 In a footnote that
accompanied the word “consumers,” the court noted, “As college costs have
been rapidly increasing, students and their parents often must make a
substantial financial investment to obtain an education.”443 The dissenting
judge, thus, argued that any ambiguity in the disciplinary rules should have
been read in the student’s favor because of his status as a “consumer” who
pays for his educational product.444 Although this was a dissenting opinion in a
non-academic freedom case, the view that students are mere consumers of
higher education is problematic because it downplays or ignores the public
good that higher education produces and reduces higher education to a
consumer good. However, this purported limitation is not fatal to contractually
based academic freedom. Just because an agreement is reduced to a written
contract does not mean that its terms have to involve only market-based values.
For example, the previously discussed use of collective bargaining agreements
to memorialize academic freedom principles is an apt illustration. While the
AAUP was initially reluctant to pursue unionization for fear of diminishing its
image as a defender of non-economic goals, it later realized that it could
capture the higher purposes of university work by incorporating these ideals
directly into the collective bargaining agreements themselves.445 In addition,
international treaties provide further insight. These treaties can be viewed as
contracts between nations.446 Some of these treaties, such as the United
Nations International Bill of Human Rights or the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, involve agreements that
reflect values, such as human dignity and preservation of the environment. The
fact that these agreements are reduced to writing in no way diminishes the nonmarket aspects of these values. Similarly, professors’ employment contracts
can reflect the social usefulness of higher education as articulated by AAUP
policy statements and acknowledged by courts without embracing a
commodity view of the American university.

442. Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Mass. 2000) (Ireland, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
443. Id. at 381 n.1.
444. Id. at 381.
445. HUTCHESON, supra note 394, at 6–7.
446. See Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and
the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 826 (2007). Chancellor Kent, writing in the
nineteenth-century, observed:
Treaties of every kind, when made by the competent authority, are as obligatory upon
nations, as private contracts are binding upon individuals; and they are to receive a fair
and liberal interpretation, and to be kept with the most scrupulous good faith. Their
meaning is to be ascertained by the same rules of construction and course of reasoning
which we apply to the interpretation of private contracts.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 163 (1826).
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CONCLUSION
This Article was motivated, in part, by my interest in the ways that higher
education, at its best, transforms the perspectives of its students by allowing an
environment of free inquiry, vigorous debate, and unhindered exploration of
various perspectives. This transformative power is situated in the freedom that
higher educational actors—both professors and universities—have over their
educationally based decisions. Academic freedom at American universities,
however, is, by no means, guaranteed. Generations of professors have fought
for it, and the fight continues to this day.
Although constitutionally based academic freedom can provide some
safeguards to educational actors from excessive state interference, it is
insufficient to protect the multitude of interests that arise in contemporary
disputes. Due to the restrictions of the state action doctrine, constitutional
academic freedom does not apply to private universities, leaving professors at
these institutions without First Amendment protection. And even in public
institutions where the Constitution is applicable, judicial decision makers have
recently put academic freedom at risk by either significantly narrowing the
protections of professorial free speech or denying the very existence of
professorial academic freedom. Further, broad constitutional remedies may be
poorly suited to address the almost infinite variation of university contexts
across the country.
There is, however, another way. Specifically, developing a body of
contractually based academic freedom case law would greatly expand the ways
that courts can protect aggrieved professors when their interests diverge from
their employers’. Unlike First Amendment principles, contract law would
protect professors at both public and private universities. It would also allow
for the proper consideration of the custom and usage of the academic
community as either express or implied contract terms in resolving disputes
between universities and professors. Finally, contract law would enable courts
to structure remedies that take into account the particular campus contexts that
give rise to various disputes instead of crafting broad remedies that may ill fit
certain campus environments.

